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In this Article, Professor Michael Wishnie addresses the current pressing problem
of denial of benefits to legal inunigrants under the 1996 Welfare Reform Act in the
context of a deeper inquiry into the very heart of immigration law: From where
does the federal government derive the power to regulate its borders? Can Con-
gress devolve this power to the states? Looking deeply into jurisprudence and ter-
tual sources, as well as history, he ascertains that this autdority always has been
exclusively federal and that to permit devolution would be to contradict the entire
notion of sovereignty. Titus, Professor Wishnie concludes that any devolution of
authority over immigration to the states, such as that contained in the 1996 welfare
reforms, may not receive the judicial deference traditionally granted to federal im-
migration law. Instead, any state exercise in the inmmigration arena, even pursuant
to Congress's explicit approval, must be evaluated under thirty years of precedent
subjecting state discrimination against permanent resident aliens to heightened
scrutiny.
INTRODUCTION
"The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly na-
tional and what is truly local."' Safeguarding that which is "truly lo-
cal" from congressional interference has been a significant concern of
the Supreme Court for the past decade,2 as well as the subject of a
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1 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating civil remedy provision of
Violence Against Women Act as unauthorized either by Commerce Clause or by Section 5
of Fourteenth Amendment).
2 See id. at 598 (invalidating portions of Violence Against Women Act as beyond
scope of congressional authority under Commerce Clause or Section 5 of Fourteenth
Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating portions of Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act on ground that Congress may not "commandeer" state
executive officials); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating portions of
Religious Freedom Restoration Act as beyond scope of congressional authority under Sec-
tion 5 of Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidat-
ing Gun-Free School Zones Act as beyond scope of congressional authority under
Commerce Clause); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating provision
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substantial literature.3 Attention to the constitutional allocation of
power also has prompted the Court to resolve claims of individual
right by reference to constitutional architecture in several other recent
and prominent cases.4 But the Court has not had much occasion to
evaluate what government powers, if any, are exclusively national.
In this Article, I consider whether the federal power to regulate
immigration, a power not specifically enumerated in the Constitution
but universally recognized for over a century,5 is among those that are
exclusively national and incapable of devolution to the states. My
question is prompted by the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare Act or PRA),6 of which
legal immigrants and their families were a principal target.7 The 1996
of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act on grounds that Congress may
not "commandeer" state legislatures); see also Bd. of Trs. v. Garratt, No. 99-1240,2001 WL
173556 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2001) (holding that Congress has not validly abrogated state sover-
eign immunity as to private disability discrimination suits for money damages); Kimel v.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (same, as to age discrimination suits in federal courts);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (same, as to private suit in state courts under Fair
Labor Standards Act); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999) (same, as to trademark suits in federal courts); Fla. Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (same, as to patent suits in
federal courts); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (same, as to suit by Native
American tribe in federal court under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
3 To cite but one thoughtful assessment of judicial intervention to protect state inter-
ests, see Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Feder-
alism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215 (2000).
4 In addition to cases cited supra note 2, see, for example, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489
(1999) (invalidating state durational residency requirement as condition of eligibility for
public benefits as violative of right to travel protected by Privileges and Immunities
Clause); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating state referendum repealing
laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and barring enactment of simi-
lar laws in future). Laurence Tribe has termed such judicial decisionmaking reasoning
from "structural inference." Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges
or Immunities Revival Portend the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113
Harv. L. Rev. 110, 110 n.3 (1999).
5 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724, 730 (1892) (upholding
congressional act excluding Chinese immigrants); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142
U.S. 651, 659 (1891) (same, as to deportation of "morally suspect" persons); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (same, as to
exclusion of Chinese laborers).
6 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare
Act or PRA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 42
U.S.C.). Title IV of the Welfare Act is entitled "Restricting Welfare and Public Benefits
for Aliens." Id. §§ 400-451, 110 Stat. at 2260-76.
7 The Congressional Budget Office estimated that approximately $23.7 billion of the
$53.4 billion in total federal savings from the PRA over its first six years-a staggering
forty-four percent-would derive from Title IV's anti-immigrant provisions. Cong. Budget
Office, Federal Budgetary Implications of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu-
nity Reconciliation Act of 1996, at 3 tbl.2 (1996); see also Charles Wheeler, The New Alien
Restrictions on Public Benefits: The Full Impact Remains Uncertain, 73 Interpreter Re-
leases 1245, 1248 & n.35 (1996) (citing Letter from Congressional Budget Office to Senator
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Welfare Act facially authorizes, but does not require, states to deny a
range of public benefits to permanent resident aliens,s an invitation
that some states already have accepted 9 and that others surely will. 1o
This federal authorization of state-imposed anti-immigrant dis-
crimination exposes longstanding wrinkles in equal protection doc-
trine, federalism, and immigration law. Under Graham v.
Pete Domenici, Chairman, Senate Budget Committee (Aug. 1, 1996)); Michael E. Fix &
Karen Tumlin, Urban Inst., Welfare Reform and the Devolution of Immigrant Policy 5 &
n.14 (1997), http'//newfederalism.urban.org/htmllanLl5.htm. Congressional restoration of
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits for some legal immigrants in the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, reduced the estimated federal sav-
ings by approximately $11.4 billion. Fx & Tumlin, supra, at 5.
8 The specific anti-immigrant provisions of the 1996 Welfare Act are discussed infra
notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
9 Louisiana was the first state in the nation to do so. See Declaration of Emergency,
23 La. Reg. 24, 25 (1997) (terminating Medicaid for legal permanent residents effective
January 1, 1997). Subsequently, Alabama terminated Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF) to permanent residents and Wyoming terminated Medicaid to permanent
residents. Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-2-2-.17 (1998) (terminating eligibility of noncitizens as
of December 21, 1996 except for those required to be eligible by PRA); Code of Wyo. R.
049-183-002, § 8(b) (Weil's, Lexis through 2000 revision) (restricting Medicaid eligibility of
noncitizens to those required to be eligible by PRA or eligible for SSI); see also Wendy
Zimmermann & Karen C. Tumlin, Patchwork Policies: State Assistance for Immigrants
Under Welfare Reform 60 tbl.5 (Urban Inst., Occasional Paper No. 24, 1999) (showing
which states have denied assistance to immigrants), http:/newfederalism.urban.orgtpdf/
occ24.pdf.
In addition, several states have enacted more onerous eligibility requirements for legal
immigrants than for citizens. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17b-116(e) (West Supp.
2000) (six-month residency requirement for immigrants); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 74.08A.100 (West Supp. 2001) (twelve-month residency requirement for immigrants
only); Md. Regs. Code tit. 07, § 07.03.03.07(B)(4) (2000) (legal immigrants newly arrived in
Maryland receive no state TANF benefits for twelve months if moved from outside country
or from state without state-substitute TANF benefits); see also Zimmermann & Tumlin,
supra, at 28 (discussing various other state restrictions). Others have chosen to condition
immigrant eligibility for benefits on the applicant's willingness to pursue naturalization.
See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17b-116(e) (naturalization requirement for general assis-
tance); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 44:10-48(a) (West Supp. 2000) (naturalization requirement for
TANF and General Assistance programs); see also Zimmermann & Ibmlin, supra, at 28-29
(discussing effect of naturalization requirements). In addition, Indiana now imposes a
shorter time limit for receipt of benefits on legal immigrants than on citizens. Compare
Ind. Code Ann. § 12-14-2-5.1(a) (West 2000) (two year AFDC eligibility generally), and id.
§ 12-15 (two year Medicaid eligibility), with id. § 12-14-2.5-2 (one year AFDC eligibility for
permanent residents), and id. § 12-15-2-7, 12-15-2.5-2 (one year Medicaid eligibility for
permanent residents).
F'mally, some states created programs to substitute for lost federal benefits but then
limited these state-substitute programs only to certain permanent residents, or imposed
eligibility restrictions on these state-substitute programs that do not apply to citizens in the
continuing federal programs. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 95(10)(b)(v) (McKinney
Supp. 2001) (requiring immigrants eligible to naturalize to do so as condition of receipt of
state food stamp replacement program); Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra at 29-30.
10 See infra notes 25-26, 127-29 and accompanying text.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2001]
HeinOnline -- 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 495 2001
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Richardson" and its progeny, state anti-immigrant discrimination gen-
erally has been subject to strict scrutiny (and therefore invalidated),'
2
but under Mathews v. Diaz13 and its progeny, identical federal dis-
crimination generally has been subject only to rational basis review
(and therefore upheld). 14 The rationale for the divergent standards is
that, at the federal level, equal protection norms must be balanced
against the deference traditionally accorded to exercises of the federal
immigration power, in light of the foreign affairs implications of immi-
gration lawmaking. The states possess no similar immigration power,
however, and therefore state or local anti-immigrant discrimination is
scrutinized solely in light of equal protection principles.
15
The Welfare Act's authorization of state discrimination against
immigrants was an attempt by Congress to devolve some of the exclu-
sively federal immigration power to the states,16 and with it the sub-
stantial immunity from ordinary judicial scrutiny that long has
accompanied exercises of the federal immigration power.'7 Although
this devolution is not explicit, I argue that it should be presumed be-
cause, under any other construction of the Welfare Act, the current
rash of anti-immigrant state welfare rules are obviously invalid under
Graham's settled rule that state welfare discrimination against legal
immigrants is unconstitutional.'
8
11 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (subjecting state welfare rules distinguishing between citizens
and legal permanent residents to strict scrutiny).
12 See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (invalidating state citizenship requirement
for appointment as notary public); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (same, as to state
financial aid for postsecondary education); Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976) (same, as to civil engineering license); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (same, as
to admission to bar); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (same, as to state civil
service employment). The exception to the rule of strict scrutiny for state anti-immigrant
discrimination is a state's citizenship requirement for jobs involving p6licymaking or exer-
cises of significant discretion, which is scrutinized only for a rational basis. See, e.g., Cabell
v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (deputy probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68 (1979) (elementary and secondary school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978) (state troopers).
13 426 U.S. 67, 82 (1976) (holding federal welfare rules distinguishing between citizens
and legal permanent residents subject to rational basis review in equal protection
challenge).
14 But see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (holding citizenship require-
ment in federal civil service subject to rationality review, and invalidating requirement).
15 See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84-87 (explaining different equal protection analysis appli-
cable to state and federal anti-immigrant discrimination in light of "exclusive federal
power" over immigration).
16 See PRA § 400(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (Supp. V 1999); infra notes 100-05 and accom-
panying text.
17 See infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 54-85 and accompanying text.
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The 1996 Welfare Act's provisions authorizing states to discrimi-
nate against immigrants are likely to be the second provisions of that
statute to be reviewed by the Supreme Court.19 I argue that a close
examination of the sources and scope of the federal immigration
power yields the conclusion that the immigration power is an exclu-
sively federal one that Congress may not devolve by statute to the
states320 Thus, the welfare rules enacted by states are not entitled to
judicial deference as immigration laws and should be evaluated under
thirty years of precedent subjecting state anti-immigrant discrimina-
tion to heightened scrutiny.21 This is not to say that states lack power
to enact welfare rules; they do, certainly, pursuant to their traditional
spending and police powers." But if a state's enactment of anti-immi-
grant welfare rules is not an act of immigration lawmaking, then these
measures are entitled to no special immunity from ordinary equality
principles.
Analysis of the constitutional implications of Congress's attempt
to devolve the federal immigration power by statute is illuminating for
several reasons. First, a number of states already have accepted the
federal invitation to discriminate23 (although none has discriminated
as severely as the federal law permits). 24 Moreover, there will come a
19 The Court already has invalidated provisions of the 1996 Welfare Act regarding du-
rational residency requirements. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (holding that state and
federal durational residency requirements violate right to travel). Unfortunately for the
nation's approximately eleven million permanent resident aliens, see Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv., U.S. Dep't of Justice, State Population Estimates: Legal Permanent Re-
sidents and Aliens Eligible to Apply for Naturalization (1996), http'l/www.ins.usdoj.govl
graphicslaboutinslstatisticsflprest.htm, and millions of other legal immigrants, the Saenz
Court implied that the right to travel is secured by the Privileges and Immunities Clauses,
which protect only the "privileges and immunities of citizers" U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2
(emphasis added); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (same, except reads "privileges or immuni-
ties"). For an account that grounds the constitutional right to travel in the Commerce
Clause rather than the citizens-only Privileges and Immunities Clause, see Stephen Lof-
fredo, "If You Ain't Got the Do, Re, Mi": The Commerce Clause and State Residency
Restrictions on Welfare, 11 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 147 (1993).
20 See infra Part III.
21 See cases cited supra notes 11-12.
22 See Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Movement, 1960-1973,
at 6 (1993) ("States adopted 400 new public welfare laws between 1917 and 1920 alone,
creating a relatively modem and rational welfare system from the patchwork of philan-
thropic local initiative of the nineteenth century."); see also infra notes 342-43 and accom-
panying text.
23 See infra notes 115-24 (describing state legislative initiatives).
24 Only four states, Alabama, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming, have tried to
terminate the eligibility of legal immigrants for TANF or Medicaid; no state yet has sought
to deny legal immigrants eligibility for both programs. See supra note 9 (citing statutes);
infra note 116 (same).
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time when state budgets are not so flush,2s and when episodic Ameri-
can nativism returns.26 Then, more states will try to balance their
budgets on the backs of indigent immigrants. Judicial assessment of
these equal protection, immigration, and federalism questions will de-
termine directly the eligibility of millions of indigent persons and their
families for life-sustaining public benefits.
27
Second, analysis of these questions is important for understand-
ing the nature of the federal immigration power. For the most part,
immigration law in this country began in the late nineteenth century,
when the Supreme Court discerned an unenumerated federal consti-
tutional power to regulate immigration.28 Since then, although few
courts or commentators have questioned the existence of such a fed-
eral power, there has been little analysis of its precise constitutional
source.29 Because the Welfare Act attempts to devolve this
unenumerated federal power to the states,30 and with it the extraordi-
25 The National Association of State Budget Officers reports that in fiscal year 2000, all
fifty states had a budget surplus, and thirty-six states had a surplus in excess of five percent
of their spending. Nat'l Ass'n of State Budget Officers, The Fiscal Survey of States: De-
cember 2000, at 11 tbl.9 (2000), http://www.nasbo.org/topical/fall2000fiscalsurvey.pdf; see
Robert Pear, States Gather Big Surpluses, Benefit of a Strong Economy, N.Y. Tines, Jan.
5, 2000, at A12. But see David Firestone, Slowing Economy Forces Governors to Trim
Budgets, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2001, at Al ("With a swiftness that has taken many governors
by surprise, the slowing economy has sharply reduced state tax revenues in the last few
weeks, forcing a growing number of states around the South and Midwest to cut their
budgets for the first time in a decade."). In addition to trends in the national and regional
economies, states soon will be forced to address the consequences of time limits on federal
welfare programs. The implementation of federal time limits in 2001 will place additional
pressure on state welfare budgets. See Raymond Hernandez, U.S. Welfare Limit May Put
Thousands in Albany's Care, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2000, at Al (noting "prospect that New
York taxpayers will have to pick up tens of millions of dollars in welfare costs once the
federal time limits take hold" in late 2001); Somini Sengupta, State's Poorest Facing Loss
of U.S. Aid, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2001, at B1 (noting that nearly one-third of New York
welfare recipients are expected to lose benefits at end of 2001 because of federal time
limits).
26 See, e.g., John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-
1925, at 14-18, 68-72 (4th ed. 1994) (tracing various episodes of nativism throughout Amer-
ican history and showing economy to be at least one factor in its emergence); Ronald
Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans 11-14, 331-35
(1989) (depicting experiences of Asians in America and setting forth history of racism).
27 Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra note 9, at 58 tbl.3 (estimating that 4.7 million nonci-
tizens lived in poverty in United States in 1996).
2 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603-04
(1889); see also Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Cen-
tury of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 853-54 (1987).
29 Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 255, 307.
30 See PRA § 400(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (Supp. V 1999); see also infra notes 100-05 and
accompanying text.
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nary judicial deference that attends its exercise,31 the statute will com-
pel the Court to determine whether the immigration power is an
exclusively federal, nondevolvable power, reserved by the architecture
and animating principles of the Constitution to Congress and the
President.
Third, examining the origins and sources of the federal immigra-
tion power sheds light on important federalism questions, including
the capacity of the states to engage in immigration lawmaking and
other foreign affairs-related activities. In an era of widespread global-
ization, state and local governments seek increasingly to participate
directly in international trade activities, and sometimes to influence
the course of foreign affairs by their procurement or investment prac-
tices.32 These activities have prompted a vigorous political and legal
debate,3 3 as well as a campaign to have the Supreme Court revisit its
31 For over a century, the Supreme Court's immigration law jurisprudence has accepted
federal discrimination not tolerated elsewhere in the law. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration,
Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."); see
also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that INS
generally does not violate First Amendment when it engages in selective enforcement of
immigration laws based on disfavored speech or associational activities of noncitizens);
iallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (upholding federal immigration discrimination based on
gender). The "plenary power doctrine," holding immigration lawmaking largely immune
from judicial scrutiny, has been criticized savagely. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's
Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46
UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1998) (condemning plenary power doctrine as product of nineteenth-
century judicial commitment to racial separation); Henkin, supra note 28, at 863 ("Chinese
Exclusion-its very name is an embarrassment-must go."); Legomsky, supra note 29, at
255-60 (arguing that Court has been oddly deferential in area of immigration); Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power. Phantom Constitutional
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale LJ. 545, 549 (1990) (arguing that plenary
power doctrine has distorted immigration jurisprudence and forced courts to incorporate
basic constitutional norms through statutory interpretation).
32 For example, at least nineteen cities and two states have passed laws restricting pub-
lic procurement from companies that do business in Burma (Myanmar). Cf. Crosby v.
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2293 & n.5 (2000) (holding state and local
"Burma laws" preempted by federal statute); see also id. at 2301-02 (discussing state and
local sanctions passed against South Africa in 1980s).
33 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich. L
Rev. 390 (1998) (criticizing treaty power exceptionalism as plenary power vis.'k-vis states);
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 Va. L Rev. 1617
(1997) (rejecting historical, structural, and normative justifications for federal common law
of foreign relations); Peter Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. Colo. L Rev. 1223
(1999) (describing obsolescence of foreign relations exclusivity). But see Louis Henkin,
Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 13 (2d ed. 1996) (defending federal supremacy in
foreign affairs); Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States
Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1277 (1999) (advocating renewed justifica-
tion for federal foreign affairs authority over states).
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landmark opinion on the topic. 34 The federal immigration power long
has been understood as closely related to the foreign affairs and for-
eign commerce powers.35 Thus, evaluating the 1996 congressional ef-
fort to include states in immigration lawmaking may contain useful
lessons for the broader debate on the role of the states in foreign
affairs.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the jurispru-
dence of state and federal anti-immigrant discrimination law, the fed-
eral provisions enacted in 1996, and the range of post-1996 state
enactments. In Part II, I examine previous analytic approaches to fed-
erally authorized, state-imposed discrimination against immigrants
and identify shortcomings in each. I propose in Part III that the con-
stitutional immigration power is an exclusively federal power that may
not be devolved by statute to the states. I analyze the case law con-
cerning immigration federalism and then examine the textual and
nontextual sources for the federal immigration power, as previously
identified by the Supreme Court and commentators. I demonstrate
that each constituent source of the immigration power is exclusively
federal and may not be devolved to the states. I also suggest that
there are sound policy reasons for the view that the federal immigra-
tion power is nondevolvable. I conclude that Congress's 1996 effort to
devolve its federal immigration power is constitutionally impermissi-
ble, and that the post-1996 anti-immigrant state welfare laws, like
their pre-1996 kin, must be subject to heightened scrutiny. In Part IV,
I identify and attempt to rebut potential objections to the
nondevolvability theory.
I
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ALIENAGE DISCRIMINATION,
THE PRA, AND POST-1996 STATE WELFARE PROVISIONS
Congress enacted the PRA against a legal backdrop that included
three overlapping doctrinal traditions: those relating to immigration
lawmaking generally, constitutional antidiscrimination principles, and
federal preemption of state and local regulation of noncitizens. In the
PRA's legislative history, Congress cited to this jurisprudence in de-
34 The landmark decision is Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (holding that dor-
mant foreign affairs preemption bars application of state escheat statute requiring inquiry
into East German system of government, as statute impermissibly involves state in foreign
affairs). The Supreme Court declined to revisit Zschernig when recently offered the op-
portunity. See Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2294 n.8 (invalidating Massachusetts "Burma law" as
preempted by federal Burma statute, but declining to rule on First Circuit's application of
Zschernig dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrine to invalidate same state law).
35 See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
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tail,36 as it attempted to devolve its federal immigration power and
thereby evade the constitutional prohibition on state anti-immigrant
discrimination. Before turning to an analysis of the constitutional
questions raised by the PRA, however, one must understand the con-
stitutional decisions that Congress sought to skirt and those that it
tried to embrace, the legislative choices reflected in the text of the
PRA itself, and the post-PRA state enactments that now will place
these questions before the judiciary.
A. Doctrinal Traditions
Several principles have emerged from a century of judicial deci-
sions regarding federalism, equal protection for immigrants, and im-
migration law. The first is the "plenary power doctrine," which holds
broadly that exercises of the federal immigration power are bound up
in foreign affairs and national security and therefore are largely im-
mune from searching judicial review.37 The second is that the Consti-
tution grants the states no like power.38 A third is that noncitizens are
"persons" protected by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.39
Two important consequences flow from these principles. First,
immigrants may bring equal protection challenges to federal laws sin-
gling out immigrants, but in light of the plenary power doctrine, courts
will scrutinize federal laws only for a "rational basis." 40 Courts there-
fore rarely invalidate a federal law as unconstitutionally discriminat-
ing against immigrants.41 Second, legal immigrants may invoke the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause against discrimina-
tory state measures, and the plenary power doctrine does not shield
states from more searching scrutiny.42 To the contrary, permanent res-
36 See infra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 54-85 and accompanying text.
40 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-84 (1976) (subjecting residency requirement in fed-
eral Medicare program that discriminates against legal immigrants to rational basis
review).
41 Id. at 67 (upholding five-year residency requirement for permanent resident aliens in
federal Medicare program); City of Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999) (af-
firming citizenship requirements in 1996 Welfare Reform Act), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1530
(2000); Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999) (same, as to Food
Stamps programs under 1996 Welfare Reform Program); Kiev v. Glickman, 991 F. Supp.
1090, 1095-97 (D. Minn. 1998) (same); Abreu v. Callahan, 971 F. Supp. 799, 807-11
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same, as to Food Stamps and SSI); Cid v. S.D. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 598
N.W.2d 887, 891-93 (S.D. 1999) (same, as to TANF). But see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88, 100-05 (1976) (invalidating federal Civil Service Commission regulation
prohibiting employment of permanent residents).
42 See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
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ident aliens (and perhaps other legal immigrants) are a "'discrete and
insular minority,"' 43 historically subjected to discrimination, and, as
nonvoters, unable to protect themselves in normal democratic
processes.44 Courts therefore have scrutinized closely state discrimi-
nation against legal immigrants and frequently invalidated it.
1. Plenary Power Principles
The accepted definition of immigration law is the regulation of
the admission and expulsion of noncitizens, or in classic terms, regula-
tion of "entrance and abode. '45 With few exceptions, the federal gov-
ernment did not regulate "entrance and abode" by noncitizens in this
country until after the Civil War.46
Despite the Reconstruction Congress's concern for the treatment
of noncitizens in some arenas, 47 it was not long before Congress
adopted restrictionist legislation, particularly targeting Chinese immi-
grants and residents.48 In response to challenges to these late nine-
43 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (quoting United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
44 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 19-24 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Graham, 403
U.S. at 371-72; Harold H. Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the
Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 Hamline L. Rev. 51, 99-100 (1985) (supporting equal protec-
tion approach over preemption approach to aliens' rights); Gerald Rosberg, The Protec-
tion of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 275, 293-316 (defending application of strict scrutiny to government anti-immigrant
discrimination); see also Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of
Aliens, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1286, 1299-1302 (1983) (surveying theory and jurisprudence of
immigration policies).
45 E.g., Legomsky, supra note 29, at 256; Motomura, supra note 31, at 547.
46 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, David A. Martin & Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and
Citizenship: Process and Policy 154-55 (4th ed. 1998). Gerald Neuman has suggested that
the pre-Civil War divide between Northern and Southern states regarding slavery pre-
vented the development of any federal policy regarding border regulation. See Gerald L.
Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 Colum. L. Rev.
1833, 1889 (1993); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants,
Borders, and Fundamental Law 51 (1996) ("The uncoupling of migration from slavery as a
result of the Civil War made federal ,regulation possible.").
47 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,214 (1982) (reviewing congressional debates on
Fourteenth Amendment and determining that "Congress ... sought expressly to ensure
that the equal protection of the laws was provided to the alien population"); see also Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (reenacting § 1 of Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and extending its prohibition on discrimination in contracting to cover
noncitizens); Duane v. Geico, 37 F.3d 1036, 1040-42 (4th Cir. 1994) (discussing legislative
history of same, and holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), modem successor to contracting
portion of § 1 of Civil Rights Act of 1866, prohibits alienage discrimination in private
contracting).
48 See, e.g., Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (suspending immigration from
China for ten years). See generally Lucy Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immi-
grants and the Shaping of Modem Immigration Law (1995) (examining experience of Chi-
nese immigrants under nineteenth century immigration laws).
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teenth-century laws, the Supreme Court declared that Congress and
the Executive Branch possessed a "plenary immigration power," and
that exercises of this power largely were immune from judicial over-
sight.49 Since then, the Court's rationale for judicial deference to ex-
ercises of the plenary immigration power has focused on the
exigencies of the conduct of foreign affairs and on a concern that the
judiciary not limit the ability of the Executive and Congress to safe-
guard national security.50
The plenary power doctrine has suffered withering criticism as a
shameful and racist relic,5 1 and a majority of Justices on the current
Supreme Court appear to be uneasy with its extreme scope.52 Never-
49 In a series of early decisions, the Court held that aliens in "exclusion" proceedings at
the nation's borders could invoke neither the procedural nor the substantive elements of
the Due Process Clause. Even aliens physically present in the country but placed in "de-
portation" proceedings could not invoke substantive due process. See Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698,724,730 (1893) (rejecting substantive challenge to deportation
statute); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (rejecting procedural
challenge to exclusion statute, for "the decisions of executive or administrative officers,
acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law"); Chae
Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (18S9) (re-
jecting substantive challenge to exclusion statute). The Court did conclude that persons
already present in the United States could bring due process challenges to the procedures
employed in deporting them. Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189
U.S. 86, 100 (1903).
50 For example, the Court stated in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), that
any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contempora-
neous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and
the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so
exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely
immune from judicial inquiry or interference.
Id. at 588-89 (footnote omitted). For similar statements, see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S.
21, 34 (1982); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1972).
51 See articles cited supra note 31; see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over Immi-
gration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of Commerce, 61 Mo. L Rev. 743,749
(1996) ("[T]he Court's nineteenth-century opinions on immigration under the Commerce
Clause reveal the shadows of slaves and indentured servants.").
52 In Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1997), the Court considered a challenge to ex-
plicit gender discrimination in a naturalization statute. Significantly, five members of the
Court-Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-wrote or joined
opinions that strongly suggested that, notwithstanding the plenary power doctrine, with the
proper plaintiff, the gender discrimination at issue would be held unconstitutional. Id. at
445-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 471 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). The Court now has an opportunity to deliver on Miller's promise, as it is
likely to resolve a post-Miller split among the Courts of Appeals. Compare United States
v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1999) (with proper plaintiff, invalidating stat-
ute at issue in Miller), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.LW. 3741 (U.S. May 22, 200) (No.
99-1872), with Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528, 535 (5th Cir. 2000) (declining to follow
Ahumada-Aguilar and upholding same statute), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 29 (2000); see also
T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power. Ju-
dicial and Executive Branch Decision-Making in Miller v. Aibright, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 3
("Miller raises the prospect that the plenary power doctrine is as inappropriate in immigra-
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theless, I do not take aim at the plenary power doctrine, as that
ground has been well covered.5 3 Instead, I wish to consider whether,
even assuming the appropriateness of some degree of judicial defer-
ence to immigration lawmaking, statutory devolution of the federal
immigration power is possible, thereby transforming otherwise uncon-
stitutional discrimination into a lawful state alienage classification.
2. Equality Principles
Anti-immigrant discrimination long has been at the heart of equal
protection jurisprudence, and courts have developed a second line of
cases holding that state and local governments may not disfavor legal
permanent residents as immigrants.5 4 One of the Supreme Court's
earliest Fourteenth Amendment decisions, Yick Wo v. Hopkins,5 5 con-
sidered the threshold question whether a noncitizen is a "person" con-
stitutionally guaranteed "the equal protection of the laws," in a
challenge to San Francisco's discriminatory denial of permits to all
Chinese laundry operators.5 6 The Court first explained that the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment "are universal in their applica-
tion, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to
any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal pro-
tection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."'57 It
went on to hold that San Francisco had engaged in impermissible dis-
crimination based on "hostility to the race and nationality" of Chinese
immigrants, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 8
Although Yick Wo settled the applicability of the Fourteenth
Amendment to all "persons," regardless of immigration status, it did
so in the context of a claim of race and nationality discrimination.
More than half a century passed before the Court confronted an im-
migrant's claim of citizenship, or "alienage," discrimination. In
tion and nationality law generally as the Justices in Miller suggest it is for jus sanguinis
citizenship claims.").
53 See supra note 31.
54 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that anti-immigrant
welfare discrimination violates equal protection); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334
U.S. 410 (1948) (same, as to discrimination in granting of commercial fishing licenses); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that anti-immigrant laundry licensing scheme
violates equal protection). For two thoughtful analyses of the Supreme Court's equal pro-
tection jurisprudence concerning immigrants, see Linda Bosniak, Membership, Equality,
and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1047 (1994); Koh, supra note
44.
55 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 369.
58 Id. at 374.
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Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,59 the Court invalidated a Cal-
ifornia statute denying commercial fishing licenses to immigrants who
were "ineligible to citizenship"-a federal classification that at the
time prevented Japanese immigrants, but few others, from naturaliz-
ing.60 The discriminatory classification in the California statute, there-
fore, while no doubt a proxy for anti-Japanese race and nationality
discrimination, 61 was in fact formally an alienage classification. The
Court's resolution was plain: "The Fourteenth Amendment and the
laws adopted under its authority... embody a general policy that all
persons lawfully in this country shall abide 'in any state' on an equal-
ity of legal privileges with all citizens under nondiscriminatory laws." 62
It was not until Graham v. Richardson63 that the Court consid-
ered a challenge to state alienage discrimination that was not, at least
obviously, a direct proxy for race or nationality discrimination. In
Graham, the Court examined alienage restrictions in Arizona and
Pennsylvania welfare statutes. Recognizing that alienage classifica-
tions implicated equal protection, Justice Blackmun wrote for a unani-
mous Court that state "classifications based on alienage, like those
based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a 'dis-
crete and insular' minority for whom such heightened judicial solici-
tude is appropriate." 64  The Graham Court emphasized that
permanent residents shouldered important civic obligations, such as
payment of taxes and subjection to military conscription, on an equal
basis with citizens. 65 In Graham, the Court then rejected the asserted
59 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
60 Id. at 412 n.1.
61 Id. at 425 (Murphy, J., concurring); see also Michael J. Perry, Modem Equal Protec-
tion: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum. L Rev. 1023, 1061 & n.194 (1979)
(characterizing Takahashi as involving alienage discrimination that "at bottom" is race
discrimination).
62 Takahashi, 334 U.S at 420. A separate strand of analysis in Takahashi also treated
the California fishing statute as an impermissible state effort effectively to deny "entrance
and abode" to immigrants lawfully admitted pursuant to an act of Congress. Id. at 418-20.
63 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
64 Id. at 371-72 (footnotes and citation omitted). The discrimination at issue in Graham
is based on alienage, but it is conceivable that the Court could have characterized it as a
form of discrimination against poor people. Under decisions that barely predate Graham,
however, such an analysis would have led the Court to apply only rationality review. See
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141-43 (1971) (equal protection challenge to state consti-
tutional amendment restricting construction of low-income housing subject to rationality
review); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (same, as to equal protection
challenge to family cap in state AFDC statute). For a critical account of the Courts use of
rationality review in evaluating classifications based on wealth, see Stephen Loffredo, Pov-
erty, Democracy, and Constitutional Law, 141 U. Pa. L Rev. 1277, 1305-67 (1993).
65 Graham, 403 U.S. at 376. In a separate holding that relied heavily on the federalism
analysis in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), see infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text,
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state interests in preserving scarce fiscal resources for citizens as insuf-
ficiently compelling to justify the alienage classifications.
66
Only five years after Graham, the Supreme Court again consid-
ered a welfare provision that restricted benefits for permanent resi-
dent aliens, and again the Court rendered a unanimous decision. This
time, however, the restriction appeared in the Medicare program, pur-
suant to a federal statute. In Mathews v. Diaz,67 the Court concluded
that that made all the difference. The Mathews Court began its analy-
sis not, as it had in Graham, with a review of civil rights cases involv-
ing immigrants, but rather by treating the Medicare restriction as an
element of federal immigration policy. Thus, the Court sounded the
the Court also explained that the state statutes were preempted by the exclusive federal
immigration power, in that state denial of welfare benefits "equate[s] with the assertion of
a right, inconsistent with federal policy, to deny entrance and abode," Graham, 403 U.S. at
380. In a later opinion, Justice Blackmun examined Graham, elaborating that "disparate
treatment accorded a class of 'similarly circumstanced' persons who historically have been
disabled by the prejudice of the majority led the Court to conclude that alienage classifica-
tions 'in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy'. and therefore demand close
judicial scrutiny." Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
66 Graham, 403 U.S. at 374-75 ("Since an alien as well as a citizen is a 'person' for equal
protection purposes, a concern for fiscal integrity is no more compelling a justification for
the questioned classification in these cases than it was in Shapiro [v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 633 (1969)]."). Importantly, the aliens in Graham were permanent resident aliens,
colloquially known as persons with "green cards" and sometimes referred to as "citizens in
training." T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7
Const. Comment. 9 (1990); Bosniak, supra note 54; David A. Martin, Due Process and
Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
165 (1983). So too were the plaintiffs in all but two of the subsequent Supreme Court
decisions regarding local anti-immigrant discrimination. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216
(1984) (invalidating bar to permanent residents serving as notary public); Nyquist v.
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (invalidating state restriction on student aid to legal permanent
residents); Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (invalidating bar to per-
manent residents obtaining license as civil engineer); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
(invalidating state bar to permanent residents obtaining admission to bar); Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (invalidating state law barring permanent resident aliens from
civil service jobs). But see Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (recognizing "po-
litical function" exception to Graham rule of strict scrutiny for certain categories of public
employment and upholding state statute excluding permanent residents from employment
as "peace officers"); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (same, as to state statute
requiring permanent resident public school teachers to declare intent to become citizens);
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (same, as to state statute limiting membership in
police force to citizens). The two cases of state or local anti-immigrant discrimination not
involving permanent residents were Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (subjecting denial of
public primary and secondary education to undocumented children to intermediate scru-
tiny and invalidating it), and Toll, 458 U.S. at 1 (holding that state denial of student finan-
cial aid to holders of G-4 visas violated Supremacy Clause). The Court, however, has not
considered which level of scrutiny to apply to state discrimination against thousands of
other legal immigrants, from student and employment visa holders to refugees and asylum
seekers.
67 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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classic themes of the plenary power doctrine: Regulation of immigra-
tion "may implicate our relations with foreign powers,"6, and the judi-
cial branch is ill-equipped to apply other than a "narrow standard of
review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area
of immigration. ' ' 69 Because the Medicare alienage restriction impli-
cated immigration policy and therefore foreign affairs, the Court rea-
soned, the restriction would be upheld so long as the classification was
not "wholly irrational." 70
The Mathews Court recognized that the extreme judicial defer-
ence given to a discriminatory federal welfare provision was at odds
with Graham's recent application of close scrutiny to a discriminatory
state welfare measure. Yet the Mathews Court explained that the
equal protection analysis in the two cases "involves significantly dif-
ferent considerations," 71 because the "Fourteenth Amendment's lim-
its on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional
provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and
naturalization." 72
The divergent standards of constitutional review for federal and
state alienage classifications-and therefore the consistently different
results of judicial review-have remained the law. For nearly thirty
years, state alienage classifications have been subjected to strict scru-
tiny and generally invalidated, 73 whereas federal alienage classifica-
tions have been reviewed for rationality and generally upheld.74
Although the Court did carve out exceptions to the strict scrutiny
standard for certain state-level public employment classifications, 75 its
68 Id. at 81.
69 Id. at 82.
70 Id. at 83.
71 Id. at 84.
72 Id. at 86-87.
73 See cases cited supra note 12. State courts also have applied strict scrutiny to state
alienage classifications in welfare programs and invalidated them as violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment. E.g., Barannikova v. Town of Greenwich, 643 A.2d 251, 264-65
(Conn. 1994) (invalidating welfare "deeming" provision applicable only to aliens); El Souri
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 414 N.W.2d 679, 687 (Mich. 1987) (same); see also State Dep't of
Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 628 & n.7 (Alaska 1993) (noting that exclusion of resident
aliens from budget surplus dividend program would be subject to strict scrutiny under fed-
eral equal protection clause); Minino v. Perales, 589 N.E.2d 385, 386-87 (N.Y. 1992) (inval-
idating provision as violative of state constitution).
74 See supra note 41.
75 Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 436, 439 (1982) (upholding as rational state
bar to noncitizens serving as deputy probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,
80-81 (1979) (same, as to public school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978)
(same, as to state troopers).
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most recent decision, Bernal v. Fainter,76 reaffirmed that the standard
rule was strict scrutiny for state alienage restrictions.
77
This divergent standard of review has not gone unnoticed. Some
critics have argued that all alienage classifications, state or federal,
should be evaluated under a single standard, but have disagreed
whether the standard should be ratcheted up or down.78 Others have
defended the lack of congruence as sensible in light of the different
roles state and federal governments play in immigration lawmaking.7 9
And since the passage of the PRA, a number of commentators have
criticized Congress's invitation to state anti-immigrant discrimina-
tion,80 while others have defended the new shape of "immigration
federalism." 8'
It is possible, of course, that the state alienage cases would be
decided differently today, at least in their invocation of strict scru-
tiny.82 The membership of the Supreme Court has changed, and more
importantly, the Court largely has discarded a rigid two-tiered ap-
proach to equal protection analysis in favor of more flexible standards
under various verbal formulations.8 3 Yet even leaving aside principles
76 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
77 Id. at 222 n.7. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented, in a single sentence, from Bernal's
straightforward application of the settled rule of Graham. Id. at 228 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); see also Cabell, 454 U.S. at 439 (applying "political function" exception to public
employment but emphasizing that Court is "not retreating from the position that restric-
tions on lawfully resident aliens that primarily affect economic interests are subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny" (emphasis added)).
78 Compare Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(outlining instances in which deferential review of anti-immigrant discrimination, state and
federal, is more appropriate than strict scrutiny), Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 658
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same), and Perry, supra note 61, at 1061-62 (same), with
Rosberg, supra note 44, at 336-39 (criticizing deferential review of federal alienage
classifications).
79 See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition
187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1425, 1430-35
(1995).
80 See, e.g., Victor Romero, Equal Protection Held Hostage: Ransoming the Constitu-
tionality of the Hostage Taking Act, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 573 (1997); Valerie L. Barth, Com-
ment, Anti-Immigrant Backlash and the Role of the Judiciary: A Proposal for Heightened
Review of Federal Laws Affecting Immigrants, 29 St. Mary's L.J. 105 (1997); Connie
Chang, Comment, Immigrants Under the New Welfare Law: A Call for Uniformity, a Call
for Justice, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 205 (1997); Recent Legislation-Welfare Reform-Treat-
ment of Legal Immigrants, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1191 (1997).
81 See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 Conn. L.
Rev. 1627 (1997).
82 See Neuman, supra note 79, at 1438 ("After the development of intermediate scru-
tiny for gender classifications in the mid-1970s, one might ask whether alienage discrimina-
tion really requires the stricter scrutiny that race receives.").
83 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (requiring "exceedingly per-
suasive justification" for gender discrimination and applying form of heightened scrutiny);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-47 (1985) (discussing height-
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of stare decisis, if the Court were to abandon strict scrutiny for state
alienage classifications, the rationale underlying Graham still should
prompt heightened judicial scrutiny for state or local anti-immigrant
discrimination. This rationale is based on the recognition that nonci-
tizens, and especially permanent resident aliens, are indeed a discrete
and insular minority, one that unquestionably has been subjected to
historical discrimination. 84 Noncitizens are unable to protect their in-
terests through the ordinary democratic process, yet they work, pay
taxes, and can be required to serve in the military. Their status as
noncitizens is and should be irrelevant to nearly all subfederal social
and economic legislation, and therefore state or local rules classifying
on the basis of citizenship should be required to demonstrate at least
the "exceedingly persuasive justification" also demanded of gender
discrimination.85
3. Federalism Principles
A third doctrinal thread traces through the jurisprudence of local
anti-immigrant discrimination: preemption of state action on the
grounds that immigration regulation is an exclusively federal power.
Outside the realm of immigration law, the Supreme Court has demon-
strated much recent interest in state-federal relations, and a narrow
majority has altered dramatically (or resurrected finally, depending on
one's point of view) long-settled notions of state sovereign immunity
and the scope of federal commerce and civil rights enforcement pow-
ers.86 There have been exceptions s7 but the plain thrust of these deci-
sions has been to elevate state power at the expense of federal
authority.
ened "quasi-suspect" standard of judicial review); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24, 230
(1982) (invalidating denial of free public education to undocumented children as failing to
further "some substantial goal of the State" under heightened standard of review).
84 See, e.g., Higham, supra note 26.
85 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33. This is not to say that the Court should abandon Gra-
ham's strict scrutiny of state alienage classifications. Rather, in light of the desirability of a
more flexible approach to equal protection analysis generally, and in recognition that im-
migration status is not always immutable, even were the current Court to revisit Graham, it
should-and there is every reason to believe it would-continue to apply a standard of
review no less demanding than that applied to gender classifications.
86 See supra note 2.
87 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-07 (1999) (holding that federally authorized,
state-imposed durational residency requirements for welfare benefits violate federal right
to travel protected by Privileges and Immunities Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837-38 (1995) (holding state-imposed term
limits on federal officeholders unconstitutional).
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In immigration, however, the federal government has reigned su-
preme for over a century. 88 Even before the federal government ex-
panded its own regulation of innigration in the 1880s, the Supreme
Court invalidated state and local efforts to regulate immigration or
legal immigrants when those measures conflicted, expressly or implic-
itly, with federal immigration policy.89 Since the late nineteenth cen-
tury, when federal regulation of immigration intensified, the Court has
been even more likely to conclude that state or local measures singling
out immigrants are preempted. 90 The judicial opinions often speak of
an "exclusive federal power" to control immigration, a power not ex-
ercised by the states and whose exercise necessarily overwhelms or
ousts any state action. 91
In its preemption decisions, the Supreme Court has distinguished
between local regulation of legal and illegal immigrants. It has af-
forded states a degree of leeway regarding illegal immigrants, whose
presence in the United States is unsanctioned by the federal govern-
ment.92 But the Court has insisted that state and local governments
may not target legal immigrants in social and economic legislation,
both permanent residents93 and other legally present noncitizens. 94
88 Cf. Neuman, supra note 46, at 1834 (arguing that in nation's first century, most immi-
gration regulation occurred at state and local level). The early history of state immigration
regulation is addressed infra notes 337-40 and accompanying text.
89 See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 281 (1876) (invalidating state inspection and
bond requirements for immigrants); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273
(1876) (invalidating state tax and bond requirement for immigrants); The Passenger Cases
(Smith v. Turner), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (invalidating state taxes on immigrants); cf.
Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142 (1837) (upholding state regulation
regarding ship manifests).
90 See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982) (holding that state denial of student finan-
cial aid to G-4 visa holders is preempted and invalid); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
376-80 (1971) (stating alternate holding that state welfare discrimination against perma-
nent residents was preempted); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419
(1948) (holding state restriction on commercial fishing licenses preempted); Hines v. Da-
vidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73-74 (1941) (finding state alien registration system preempted);
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (finding local employment restriction on immigrants
preempted); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224-26 (1982) (noting that state denial of
public education to undocumented children was not authorized by Congress). But see De
Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 365 (1976) (declining to hold that state employment restric-
tions as to undocumented workers are preempted).
91 See, e.g., De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354 ("[T]he power to regulate immigration is unques-
tionably exclusively a federal power."); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (stating that federal immigration power is "inca-
pable of transfer" and "cannot be granted away"); Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280 ("The passage
of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our
shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States.").
92 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225; De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356-63.
93 Graham, 403 U.S. at 371 (noting that Fourteenth Amendment encompasses legal
immigrants); Hines, 312 U.S. at 73-74 (invalidating state registration requirement for legal
immigrants).
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The rationale in the preemption cases is that oppressive local mea-
sures are tantamount to a denial of "entrance and abode," and there-
fore conflict with the federal government's prior approval of a legalimmigrant's admission.95 In contrast, since the federal government
has not sanctioned the "entrance and abode" of undocumented immi-
grants, the Court has held that local oppression of undocumented per-
sons is not necessarily in conflict with federal policy.
96
B. The New Legislative Order
The PRA enacts dramatic changes in federal, state, and local ben-
efits programs for citizens and immigrants. Immigrants, especially le-
gal immigrants, were plainly a chief congressional target.
Approximately $23.7 billion of the PRA's anticipated $53.4 billion in
federal fiscal savings, or forty-four percent of the overall estimated
federal savings, derived from the provisions that would deny benefits
to indigent legal immigrants97 -even though a far lower percentage of
94 Toll, 458 U.S. at 17 (invalidating state denial of in-state tuition to nonimmigrant
aliens who hold G-4 visas).
95 See, e.g., Graham, 403 U.S. at 378 (noting that "aliens lawfully within this country
have a right to enter and abide in any State"); Truax, 239 U.S. at 42 ("The assertion of an
authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted
to the State would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and
abode .... ). Early in the twentieth century the Court recognized a "special public inter-
est" exception to the rule of Truax, permitting state or local authorities to enact some
alienage classifications without contravening the prior federal authorization for entrance
and abode. See, e.g., Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195, 198 (1915) (upholding state restric-
tion on employment of noncitizens on public works projects); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232
U.S. 138, 143-46 (1914) (upholding state statute that prohibited noncitizens from hunting
wild game and owning shotguns or rifles). The "special public interest" exception was
discredited in Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 420, and rejected in Graham, 403 U.S. at 374
("Whatever may be the contemporary vitality of the special public-interest doctrine in
other contexts after Takahashi, we conclude that a State's desire to preserve limited wel-
fare benefits for its own citizens is inadequate to justify [welfare restrictions for permanent
resident aliens].").
96 See, e.g., De Canas, 424 U.S. at 365 (holding state prohibition on employment of
undocumented immigrants not preempted). Some academic and judicial commentators
have suggested that a preemption analysis of state and local anti-immigrant discrimination
would be a more sensible approach than the equal protection analysis frequently em-
ployed. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 61, at 1060-65. The Supreme Court itself has shifted
between the two modes of analysis, employing one, the other, or both. Compare Bemal v.
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216,219-22 (1984) (equal protection analysis only), Toll, 458 U.S. at 9-10
(preemption analysis only), and Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205 (equal protection analysis only),
with Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (1976) (both equal protection
and preemption analysis), and Graham, 403 U.S. at 376, 380 (same). Critics have re-
sponded persuasively that preemption analysis leads to a "hollow formalism" that denies
the equality and anticaste force of the equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Koh, supra note
44, at 98.
97 Cong. Budget Office, supra note 7, at 3; see also Fix & Tumlin, supra note 7, at 5 &
n.14; Wheeler, supra note 7, at 1248. Congressional restoration of SSI and Medicaid bene-
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welfare recipients were legal immigrants.98 Congress has achieved its
goal: "Since the passage of welfare reform, benefit participation rates
among noncitizens have dropped faster than among citizens." 99
Devolution in general, and devolution of the immigration power
in particular so as to evade the Graham rule were central to congres-
sional design of the PRA. The Act itself declares that "[s]elf-suffi-
ciency has been a basic principle of United States immigration law
since this country's earliest immigration statutes"'00 and that state
welfare rules regarding immigrants serve to further "the compelling
government interest in assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accor-
dance with national immigration policy."1o1 The House conference re-
port is even more stark, proclaiming that "it continues to be the
immigration policy of the United States that noncitizens within the
Nation's borders not depend on public resources,"'10 and further that
"it is a compelling government interest to enact new eligibility and
sponsorship rules to assure that noncitizens become self-reliant and to
remove any incentive for illegal immigration.'' 0 3 Moreover, the legis-
lative history makes plain that Graham was an explicit target of sev-
eral provisions of the PRA,104 and influential restrictionist
fits for some legal immigrants in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33,
§§ 5301-5308, 111 Stat. 251, 577-603 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.), reduced the estimated federal savings by approximately S11.4 billion. Fix &
Tumlin, supra note 7, at 5.
98 Michael Fix & Jeffrey S. Passel, Urban Inst., Trends in Noncitizens' and Citizens' Use
of Public Benefits Following Welfare Reform: 1994-1997, Detailed Table B (1999), http://
www.urban.org/immig/trends.html.
99 Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra note 9, at 12.
100 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1) (Supp. V 1999) (emphasis added).
101 Id. § 1601(7) (emphasis added).
102 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 378 (1996) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2766.
103 Id. Nearly identical statements appear in the House report accompanying the legis-
lation that would become Title IV of the PRA. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-651, at 1441 (1996)
(stating:
[I]t continues to be the immigration policy of the U.S. that noncitizens within
the nation's borders not depend on public resources... and... it is a compel-
ling government interest to enact new eligibility and sponsorship rules to as-
sure that noncitizens become self reliant and to remove any incentive for illegal
immigration.
(emphasis added)), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2500.
104 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 384 (discussing Graham in section on federal
authorization for state denial of state benefits and characterizing decision as prohibiting
denial of state assistance to permanent residents "without authorization from Congress"),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2772; id. at 386 (discussing Graham and its progeny
in section on federal authorization for state attribution of sponsor's income and resources,
and characterizing them as prohibiting state sponsor-deeming "without Federal authoriza-
tion"), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2774. The House report contains nearly identical
statements. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-651, at 1445 (discussing Graham in section on federal
authorization for state denial of state benefits), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2504;
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commentary has emphasized the view that welfare rules are an impor-
tant aspect of our national immigration policy.105
As to legal immigrants, the PRA made two kinds of changes,
mandatory and optional. The PRA requires that persons in specified
statuses 0 6 be eligible for certain federal, state, or joint federal-state
benefits programs, 0 7 and that persons in other specified statuses not
be eligible for certain programs. 08 Second, the Act authorized-but
in no way required-the states to impose an alienage classification in
certain state or federal-state programs.10 9 Nothing in the PRA or
id. at 1448 (discussing Graham in section on federal authorization for state attribution of
sponsor's income and resources), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2507.
105 See, e.g., George J. Borjas, Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American
Economy 105 (1999) ("[G]enerous welfare programs can create a magnet that influences
the migration decisions of persons in the source countries .... [Tjhe empirical link be-
tween immigration and welfare is indisputable."); id. at 114 ("IT]here are good reasons to
be concerned with the possibility that generous welfare programs might attract a particular
type of immigrant .... ).
106 The PRA created a new term, "qualified alien," which includes some, but far from
all, legal immigrants. Legal permanent residents are "qualified aliens," as are some refu-
gees and asylees, Cuban-Haitian entrants, Amerasians, persons paroled into the United
States by the Attorney General for a period of one year or more, and certain aliens who
have been the victims of domestic abuse. 8 U.S.C. § 1641 (Supp. V 1999). All other nonci-
tizens are not eligible for federal benefits, including undocumented immigrants, refugees
and asylees who have been in the United States for more than seven years, and legal immi-
grants who never were "qualified aliens" (such as persons with student or employment
visas, or those with pending asylum or adjustment applications). See, e.g., id.
§ 1101(a)(15)(F), 1101(a)(15)(H), 1158(d)(2), 1255(a), 1612(a)(2)(A).
107 See, e.g., id. § 1611(b)(1) (stating that all persons, regardless of immigration status,
are eligible for specified programs, including emergency Medicaid, disaster relief, and im-
munization programs); id. § 1611(a)(2) (describing certain qualified aliens who are eligible
for SSI and Food Stamps programs); id. § 1612(b)(2) (stating that certain aliens "shall be
eligible" for Medicaid, TANF, and Title XX social service block grant programs); id.
§ 1622(b) (stating that certain qualified aliens "shall be eligible" for state benefits
programs).
108 See, e.g., id. §§ 1611(a), 1612(a) (Supp. V 1999) (stating that all nonqualified aliens,
and some qualified aliens, are "not eligible" for SSI or Food Stamps); id. § 1611(a) (stating
that all nonqualified aliens are ineligible for Medicaid, TANF, and Title XX social service
block grant programs); id. § 1621(a) (stating that certain nonqualified aliens are "not eligi-
ble" for specified state benefits programs); see also id. § 1621(d) (stating that state may
provide state or local benefits to undocumented immigrant "only through the enactment of
a State law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for such eligibility"). This
last provision would appear to violate the Tenth Amendment. See Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not "commandeer" state executive offi-
cials to implement federal mandate); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
(holding that Congress may not compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program); Erwin Chemerinsky, Memorandum on the Constitutionality of Section 411(d) of
H.R. 3734 (Sept. 1996) (unpublished memorandum, on file with the New York University
Law Review) (arguing that provision that became § 1621(d) may violate Tenth
Amendment).
109 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1) (authorizing states to "determine the eligibility" of
qualified aliens for Medicaid, TANF, and Title XX block grants); id. § 1622(a) (authorizing
states to "determine the eligibility for any State public benefits" of certain qualified and
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elsewhere in federal law penalizes or rewards state choices to grant or
deny benefits to immigrants; as to this choice, the federal government
is entirely neutral. In this Article, I am concerned only with the latter
optional changes, the federal authorization for states to engage in
alienage classifications. 110
The PRA's sweeping changes to public benefits programs com-
pelled nearly every state legislature to rewrite vast swaths of state
law."' This process began in late 1996 in some states and continues to
the present, as states refine their rules"12 and respond to restoration of
some benefits at the federal level.'13 In addition, in all states, the state
and local welfare changes could not actually take effect until state,
certain nonqualified aliens); id. § 1632(a) (authorizing states to "deem" income and re-
sources of indigent alien to include income and resources of alien's sponsor).
110 The PRA made a number of other important changes relating to noncitizens, which
are likely to prompt constitutional challenges. One set of provisions requires states that
receive TANF grants to report quarterly to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) the names and addresses of all persons the state knows to be "not lawfully present in
the United States." PRA § 404, 42 U.S.C. § 611(a) (Supp. IV 1998). Such provisions raise
"unconstitutional conditions" problems in the case, for example, of an undocumented
mother with a child who is a U.S. citizen, where the child is eligible for benefits but the
mother will be deported if she applies on behalf of her child for those benefits. See
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1427 (1989);
see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring) ("If the resident chil-
dren of illegal aliens were denied welfare assistance, made available by government to all
other children who qualify, this also-in my opinion-would be an impermissible penaliz-
ing of children because of their parents' status."). Another set of PRA provisions prohibits
state or local governments from adopting "antisnitch" policies, that is, policies directing
state or local employees not to report persons to INS. 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (Supp. V 1999).
The Second Circuit recently rejected a Tenth Amendment challenge to these provisions
brought by the City of New York, City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d
Cir. 1999), which, like a number of municipalities, has had an antisnitch ordinance for
years, New York, N.Y., Exec. Order No. 124 (1989) (on file with the New York University
Law Review).
111 In addition to the PRA's immigrant provisions, the act made numerous other revi-
sions to federal and state welfare laws. To list but a few changes, the PRA eliminated Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a categorical, need-based program, and
replaced it with a system of block grants, called TANF, which allows each state significant
discretion in determining how to spend the grant, 42 U.S.C. § 604(a), establishes time limits
for recipients of TANF funds, subject to some exceptions, id. § 608(a)(7), and authorizes
durational residency requirements, id. § 604(c). But see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,507-11
(1999) (holding Congressional authorization of durational residency requirements
unconstitutional).
112 See Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra note 9, at 6 ("It has been over two and a half
years since the federal welfare law passed, but states are not done setting policy for
immigrants.").
113 See, e.g., Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 5301-5308, 111 Stat.
251, 597-603 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (restoring eligibility of
some legal immigrants for SSI); Agricultural Research, Extension and Education Reform
Act of 1998 §§ 503-504, 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A), (F) (restoring eligibility of some legal
immigrants for Food Stamps).
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county, and municipal welfare agencies had promulgated new regula-
tions to implement the state and local legislative changes.
114
States were surprisingly reluctant to restrict immigrant eligibility
for benefits.115 After passage of the PRA, only three states chose to
close a major federal-state program-TANF or Medicaid-to legalimmigrants entirely,116 and no state closed its General Assistance
(GA) program.117 A number of other states declined to terminate eli-
gibility for TANF or Medicaid entirely but did enact "immigrant-
only" eligibility criteria, such as a durational residency requirement
only for legal immigrants, 18 a requirement that immigrants eligible to
114 Some states attempted to expedite the PRA's implementation through the use of
emergency rulemaking authority. In Louisiana, for example, the state's Department of
Health and Hospitals published an "emergency rule" in January 1997 directing the termi-
nation of Medicaid benefits for all immigrants except those required by the PRA to remain
eligible, effective January 1,1997. Declaration of Emergency, 23 La. Reg. 24,25 (1997). In
the face of local advocacy against implementation of the emergency rule, and on the eve of
litigation, Louisiana rescinded its rule. The most extreme example of the use of emergency
rulemaking was probably New Mexico's decision to bypass the state legislature entirely
and simply to implement the PRA by agency rulemaking. This effort was enjoined by the
state supreme court as violative of separation of powers principles. State ex rel. Taylor v.
Johnson, 961 P.2d 768 (N.M. 1998).
115 The most detailed empirical study of state choices regarding immigrant access to
benefits after the PRA is that of the Urban Institute. See Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra
note 9.
116 Louisiana barred legal immigrants from eligibility for Medicaid, but rescinded its
rule on the eve of implementation. Telephone Interview with Martha Kegel, former Legal
Director, ACLU of Louisiana (Oct. 10, 2000). Alabama barred noncitizens from TANF,
and Wyoming closed Medicaid to them. See supra note 9. In addition, shortly before the
President signed the PRA into law, Pennsylvania denied cash and medical assistance to
legal immigrants, see Act 1996-35, § 14.2, 1996 Pa. Laws 175, 202 (codified at 62 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 432.22 (West 1996)), but operation of the statute was suspended by an opinion
letter issued by the state Attorney General, see Official Opinion No. 96-1, Op. Att'y Gen.
of Pa. (Dec. 9, 1996), available in 1996 Pa. AG LEXIS 2.
117 "General Assistance" (GA) is the "generic term for public assistance programs that
are funded and authorized exclusively by state and local law." Loffredo, supra note 19, at
164. Thirty-three states have a GA program. Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra note 9, at 31
& n.66. The Urban Institute reports that Michigan effectively limits immigrant eligibility
to its GA program to those immigrants eligible for SSI, which has the effect of denying GA
benefits to permanent residents who arrived in the United States before August 22, 1996,
were not receiving SSI on that date, and are elderly but not disabled, as well as to perma-
nent residents arriving after August 22, 1996. Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra note 9, at 66
tbl.10; id. at 66 nn.24-25. Under current Michigan regulations, however, it appears that all
legal permanent residents, as well as other "qualified aliens," and even students and tour-
ists, are eligible for Michigan's GA program. Family Independence Agency, State of
Mich., State Emergency Relief Manual No. SER 201, Residence, Age, and Citizenship 1
(2001), http://vwvw.mfia.state.mi.usfolmweblexlserlser.pdf.
118 Washington, Maryland, and Connecticut enacted durational residency requirements
for immigrants only. See supra note 9; cfl Loffredo, supra note 19 (noting that right to
travel derives from Commerce Clause). But see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-07 (1999)
(stating that durational residency requirement violates right to travel, which is protected by
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naturalize do so as a condition of eligibility for benefits, 119 a rule treat-
ing the income and resources of an immigrant's sponsor as available to
the immigrant (known as "sponsor deeming"), 120 or shorter time-lim-
its for legal immigrants. 121 Moreover, many states have chosen to re-
strict immigrant access to their GA or state medical assistance
programs through a combination of the above requirements.122
In addition, the PRA prompted states to attempt to fill gaps left
by immigration restrictions under federal benefits. Most states estab-
lished at least one state-substitute program to assist permanent re-
sidents who are ineligible for TANF and Medicaid because they have
arrived in the United States after enactment of the PRA, or to assist
those who lost SSI or Food Stamps benefits. 123 This did not achieve
the same level of pre-1996 assistance, however, as states also imposed
Fourteenth Amendment provision safeguarding "the privileges or immunities of citizens"
(emphasis added)).
119 Connecticut and New Jersey now require legal immigrants to pursue naturalization
as a condition of receipt of benefits. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17b-116(e) (West Supp.
2000) (TANF, Medicaid, and GA programs); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 44:10-48(a) (West Supp0
2000) (TANF and GA programs). But see Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1977)
(holding that under Graham, state may not require legal immigrants to pursue naturaliza-
tion as condition of receipt of benefits). Perhaps aware of Nyquist, other states encourage
but do not require immigrants to pursue citizenship. See, e.g., Col. Rev. Stat. § 26-2-
111.8(6) (1999); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 74.08A.130 (West Supp. 2001).
120 Forty-three states accepted the federal invitation to implement sponsor-deeming
rules in their TANF programs for permanent residents who arrived before August 22, 1996.
Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra note 9, at 27. But see supra note 73 (listing cases holding
state sponsor-deeming rules unconstitutional).
121 Compare Ind. Code Ann. § 12-14-2-5.1(a), (b) (West 2000) (two-year AFDC eligibil-
ity generally), and id. § 12-15 (West 1994) (two-year Medicaid eligibility), with id. § 12-14-
2.5-2 (one-year AFDC eligibility for permanent residents), and id. § 12-15-2-7 (one-year
Medicaid eligibility for permanent residents).
122 Ten states deny GA to at least some permanent residents who arrived in the United
States after August 22, 1996, four impose a residency requirement not imposed oln citizens,
six impose a naturalization requirement, and fourteen apply a sponsor-deeming rule, none
of which are required by the PRA. Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra note 9, at 66-72 tbls.10-
12. In addition, New Jersey provides GA for five years to citizens, but for only six months
to legal immigrants. Id. at 33. Similarly, four states deny state medical assistance to at
least some permanent residents who arrived in the United States after August 22, 1996, two
impose a residency requirement not imposed on citizens, two impose a naturalization re-
quirement, and eight apply a sponsor-deeming rule, none of which are required by the
PRA. Id. at 73-79 tbls.13-15. Though not included in the Urban Institute tables, New York
also currently denies nonemergency state medical assistance to some permanent residents
who entered after August 22, 1996. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 122(1)(c)(i) (McKinney
Supp. 2000).
123 California is the only state to have established all four state substitute programs, but
twenty-seven other states enacted at least one state substitute program. Zimmermann &
Tumlin, supra note 9, at 23 fig.3, 59 tbl4.
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eligibility criteria on these state-substitute programs that are not im-
posed on citizens participating in the parallel federal program.
12 4
What is somewhat remarkable is that so many states, at least for
the time being, have elected not to exclude legal immigrants from
TANF, Medicaid, and general assistance programs, despite the ex-
press federal authorization to do so. The states with the largest popu-
lation of immigrants, including relatively generous California and New
York, imposed few or none of the menu of immigrant restrictions au-
thorized by the PRA, and in some instances have been among the
most aggressive in creating state-substitute programs for immigrants
denied SSI and Food Stamps.'25 Legislatures in states with relatively
small immigrant populations such as Maine and Nebraska, although
likely less familiar with the day-to-day life of noncitizens, also gener-
ally did not engage in anti-immigrant discrimination to the extent in-
vited by the PRA.126
These state choices probably were influenced by state and local
advocacy efforts on behalf of immigrants and welfare recipients, a
general public reaction to the 104th Congress's anti-immigrant ex-
tremism, and relatively prosperous state economies.1 27 In addition,
many state and local authorities recognized that TANF and Medicaid
have federal matching funds for eligible legal immigrants, but emer-
gency state programs, such as food pantries and homeless shelters, do
not-and thus the fiscal incentive to save the state-funded portion of
Medicaid and TANF likely would be at least partially offset by in-
creased spending on 100% state and local emergency services.128 Fi-
124 For example, nineteen states have a state substitute TANF program for permanent
residents during the five-year bar period. Id. at 60 tbl-5. Of those nineteen states, how-
ever, three established a naturalization requirement, seven imposed a residency require-
ment that exceeds that for citizens in the regular TANF program, and sixteen apply a
sponsor-deeming rule not mandated by the PRA. Id. at 63 tbl.7.
125 Id. at 23 fig3. INS estimates that over eighty percent of legal immigrants in this
country live in six states: California (353%), New York (14.2%), Texas (7.8%), Florida
(7.5%), New Jersey (4.4%), and Illinois (4.3%). Immigration & Naturalization Serv., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, State Population Estimates: Legal Permanent Residents & Aliens Eligi-
ble to Apply for Naturalization (1996), httpil/www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics!aboutins!statis-
ticsllprest.htm.
126 Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra note 9, at 46.
127 Telephone Interview with Josh Bernstein, Senior Policy Analyst, National Immigra-
tion Law Center (Oct. 10, 2000); see also supra note 25. The Urban Institute concluded
that states with higher per capita incomes and more generous benefits programs prior to
the enactment of the PRA have tended "to keep that safety net open to immigrants," but
that state budget surpluses have not correlated with higher immigrant access to benefits.
Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra note 9, at 46.
128 Charles Wheeler states:
Governors have every reason ... not to eliminate Medicaid eligibility for
[qualified aliens], since the states are reimbursed by the federal government
for approximately 50 percent of the medical costs claimed under Medicaid ....
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nally, some states may have acted on an aversion to involve state
legislative and administrative officials more deeply than necessary in
the intricacies of federal immigration classifications, with its myriad
categories of legal immigrants.' 2 9
In short, the legal landscape may be summarized thus: In 1996
Congress invited but did not require states to deny a variety of welfare
benefits to legal immigrants. To date, about a half-dozen states have
accepted the federal invitation in the major federal-state programs,
TANF and Medicaid, by either totally denying benefits to legal immi-
grants or enacting "immigrant-only" eligibility restrictions.1 30 A
larger number of states have imposed immigrant-only eligibility re-
strictions in their purely state programs, GA and various state-substi-
tute programs.' 31 Yet it seems likely that upon the next economic
downturn or wave of nativism, more states will seek to accept the
broad federal invitation to enact anti-immigrant restrictions in local
benefits programs.
The question posed, then, is whether the PRA's authorization for
state anti-immigrant discrimination removes current and future state
alienage classifications from Graham's requirement of heightened
scrutiny, and more broadly, whether Congress may by statute devolve
the federal immigration power so that state measures receive the sub-
stantial judicial deference suggested by the "plenary power" doctrine.
To answer these questions, one must return to the doctrinal traditions
of equal protection, the plenary power decisions, and federalism.
II
PREvious ANALYSES OF FEDERALLY IMPOSED, STATE-
AUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT DISCRIMINATION
The judiciary hardly has begun to grapple with anti-immigrant
welfare discrimination under the PRA. To date, challenges to federal
alienage classifications in the PRA have been unsuccessful, as all
courts have concluded that the Mathews "rational basis" standard ap-
plies and is satisfied.132 In addition, the Attorney General of Penn-
[Moreover,] communicable diseases left untreated will spread to the general
population, resulting in a threat to public health and even higher costs to the
states and federal government.
Wheeler, supra note 7, at 1249-50 (footnote omitted).
129 Telephone Interview with Josh Bernstein, supra note 127.
130 See supra note 9.
131 See supra notes 9, 118-24.
132 See cases cited supra note 41. In addition, two state intermediate courts have ad-
dressed challenges to post-PRA state programs. See Aliessa v. Novello, 712 N.Y.S.2d 96,
98-99 (App. Div. 2000) (holding New York law providing state medical assistance benefits
to eligible citizens, but denying same to some permanent residents and other legal immi-
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sylvania has issued a binding opinion letter concluding that
Pennsylvania constitutionally may not accept the federal invitation to
deny state benefits to legal immigrants. 133 Despite the dearth of case
law, a limited body of precedent and commentary that predates the
PRA considered the hypothetical implications of federally approved,
state-imposed alienage classifications in welfare programs.
A. Prelude: The Graham v. Richardson Rationale
In Graham v. Richardson,134 the Supreme Court invalidated state
alienage classifications as violative of both equal protection and pre-
emption principles. But the Court also was forced to address a third
argument made by Arizona in defense of its alienage restrictions: Its
immigrants-only durational residency requirement "is actually author-
ized by federal law." 135
The Graham Court ducked this difficult question by construing
the federal statute at issue as not authorizing Arizona's alienage clas-
sification. Foreshadowing the issues raised by the 1996 Welfare Act,
the Court explained that if the federal statute "were to be read so as
to authorize discriminatory treatment of aliens at the option of the
States, Takahashi demonstrates that serious constitutional questions
are presented."' 3 6 The Court had two concerns in mind: first, the
principle that "Congress does not have the power to authorize the
individual States to violate the Equal Protection Clause;"137 and sec-
ond, that "[a] congressional enactment construed so as to permit state
legislatures to adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship re-
quirements for federally supported welfare programs would appear to
contravene [the] explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity"1 38
contained in the Naturalization Clause.13
9
grants, subject to rationality review and valid); Alvarino v. Wing, 690 N.Y.S2d 262, 263
(App. Div. 1999) (holding New York law providing substitute benefits to some but not all
permanent residents denied federal Food Stamps, where program does not offer similar
benefits to citizens because they remain eligible for federal Food Stamps, subject to ration-
ality review and valid). Only the former decision involves a federally authorized, state-
imposed classification between citizens and permanent residents. To the extent that either
holds that post-PRA state discrimination against permanent residents is subject to rational-
ity review and valid under the Fourteenth Amendment, they are incorrect.
133 Official Opinion No. 96-1, Op. Att'y Gen. of Pa. (Dec. 9, 1996), at 12, available in
1996 Pa. AG LEXIS 2, at *23-*24.
134 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
135 Id. at 380. This is precisely the argument that one would expect from a state defend-
ing a post-PRA alienage classification.
136 Id. at 382.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, ci. 4 (empowering Congress "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization ... throughout the United States").
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At one level, the Graham Court's first concern is unremarkable.
The Court frequently has recited that Congress is without power to
ratify or legitimize a state's violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 140 And yet, the Court generally has made such declarations
only when the state's conduct also would be forbidden were it under-
taken by the federal government.' 4 When it decided Graham, in con-
trast, the Supreme Court had not yet decided whether Congress itself
could deny public benefits to permanent residents. 142
One reasonably might counter that the Graham decision does not
analyze in any great detail the rather striking proposition that Con-
gress constitutionally is precluded from authorizing the states to un-
dertake action that would be permissible if done directly by Congress
itself.143 Certainly the principle begs important questions. Why is
Congress barred from doing indirectly what it could do directly? Is
140 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507-08 (1999) ("[W]hether congressional ap-
proval of durational residency requirements in the [PRA] somehow resuscitates the consti-
tutionality of [California's rule] ... is readily answered, for we have consistently held that
Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment." (citation
omitted)); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732-33 (1982) ("Although we
give deference to congressional decisions and classifications, neither Congress nor a State
can validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.");
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) ("Congress is without power to enlist state
cooperation in a joint federal-state program by legislation which authorizes the States to
violate the Equal Protection Clause."); White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 649 (1871)
(holding that Congress cannot authorize states to violate Contracts Clause). The same
principle has been applied to other congressional attempts to limit by statute the constitu-
tional rights of aliens. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973)
(explaining, in case involving Fourth Amendment rights of aliens, that "no Act of Congress
can authorize a violation of the Constitution"); see also 1 Laurence Tribe, American Con-
stitutional Law 1238 (3d ed. 2000) ("Congress cannot authorize a state to violate a consti-
tutional command designed to protect private rights against government action (such as
the commands of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment).").
141 See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731 (forbidding gender discrimination in education). In
Saenz v. Roe, for instance, the Court emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment right at
stake, the right to travel, "is a limitation on the powers of the National Government as well
as the States." 526 U.S. at 508.
142 Graham, 403 U.S. at 382 n.14 ("We have no occasion to decide whether Congress, in
the exercise of the immigration and naturalization power, could itself enact a statute im-
posing on aliens a uniform nationwide residency requirement as a condition of federally
funded welfare benefits."). It was not until five years after Graham that the Supreme
Court answered this question in the affirmative. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82-83
(1976) ("[Ilt is unquestionably reasonable for Congress to make an alien's eligibility [for
benefits] depend on both the character and the duration of his residence.").
143 The briefs to the Court barely explored the question of federal statutory authoriza-
tion for state discrimination. The argument was raised only by the Arizona appellants,
Graham, 403 U.S. at 380, but it was not even acknowledged by the Arizona appellees, see
Brief for Appellee at 2, 7, 9, 11, Graham (No. 609) (on file with the New York University
Law Review), and apparently addressed only in a single paragraph by one amicus brief, see
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union at 10, Graham (Nos, 609, 727) (on
file with the New York University Law Review).
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there something special about immigrants, or immigration law, or
equal protection? If not, how is one to distinguish analysis of local
alienage classifications from other constitutional doctrines in which
Congress is capable of ratifying otherwise unconstitutional state prac-
tices-as in the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and perhaps,
Native American law?144 Is it even fair to characterize congressional
approval of state and local anti-immigrant discrimination as "authoriz-
ing" a Fourteenth Amendment violation, when at best a federal stat-
ute might serve merely to ratchet down the degree of equal protection
scrutiny applied to state discrimination, from strict scrutiny to rational
basis review? That is, when a statute seeks to alter but not eliminate
the degree of judicial scrutiny, can Congress be said even to be "au-
thorizing" a constitutional violation? 145
The Graham Court's second concern about a federal statute au-
thorizing states to discriminate against immigrants arose from the Nat-
uralization Clause.146 It is not immediately evident that state welfare
rules have anything to do with naturalization, the process by which
one becomes a citizen.147 It is possible that the Graham Court be-
144 See infra notes 344-51 and accompanying text.
145 In other contexts, the current Court has reacted poorly to congressional efforts to
dictate the degree of constitutional scrutiny applied to local rules. See Dickerson v. United
States, 120 S. CL 2326, 2332-33 (2000) (stating that "Congress may not legislatively super-
sede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution ... ." (citing City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-21 (1997))); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507 (invalidating provision of
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which attempted to require application of
balancing test of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), to free exercise challenges to
state laws of general applicability, rather than rule of Employment Div. v. Smith. 494 U.S.
872 (1990)).
146 Graham, 403 U.S. at 382; see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress
"[tjo establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization... throughout the United States"). In
his post-PRA Opinion Letter, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania reached a similar
conclusion. See Official Opinion No. 96-1, Op. Att'y Gen. of Pa. (Dec. 9, 1996), at 5-6,
available in 1996 Pa. AG LEXIS 2, at *11; see also Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional
Arrogation of Power Alien Constellation in the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L
Rev. 591, 637 (1994) ("[S]tate legislation that disqualifies lawful resident aliens from eligi-
bility for public benefits, even if enacted pursuant to a federal statute, would clearly con-
travene the Naturalization Clause."). Recent amendments to the immigration laws
providing for incorporation of diverse state criminal statutes have prompted similar criti-
cism. See, e.g., Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869,874 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that need
for uniform interpretation of immigration statutes leads federal courts to develop common
definitions of terms such as "burglary"); Iris Bennett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of
Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of "Aggravated Felony" Convictions, 74 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1696, 1730-34 (1999) (arguing that federal courts should develop "uniformity re-
quirement" in immigration law in order to "prevent ununiform immigration consequences
for state law criminal convictions, promote fairness, and ensure that immigration law is
consonant with the Constitution").
147 Naturalization generally is available to permanent residents who have resided con-
tinuously for five years in the United States (three years if married to a citizen), satisfy a
local residency requirement, pass an English and a civics test, demonstrate good moral
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lieved denial of state benefits could interfere with a naturalization ap-
plicant's ability to satisfy certain residency requirements,1 48 echoing
the preemption analysis sometimes applied to state alienage classifica-
tions,149 but this is probably far-fetched.150 It is also possible that the
Graham Court erroneously conflated naturalization law with immi-
gration law.'
5 '
The Graham Court's statement that a federal statute authorizing
state alienage classifications would be unconstitutional fails to address
a number of important questions. Yet the unanimous conviction of
nine Justices that such a law would violate core principles of immigra-
tion law and the constitutional architecture is well warranted. In Part
III, I return to the questions prompted by the final Graham holding
and argue that the Court's 1971 intuition was indeed correct.
B. The Membership Rationale: Immigration and Alienage Law
In addition to some limited elaboration of the Graham ratio-
nale,' 52 before the 1996 enactment of the PRA academic commenta-
character, and take an oath of allegiance. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1423, 1427, 1430, 1448 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999); 8 C.F.R. §§ 312, 316, 319.1, 337 (2000).
148 A naturalization applicant must reside within the state or INS district from which she
applies "for at least three months" before making her application, and continuously there-
after. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (Supp. V 1999). At the time Graham was decided, the statute
established a six-month state residency requirement. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1970).
149 See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 34 (1915) (holding denial of employment to be
tantamount to denial of entrance and abode and, therefore, preempted by federal immigra-
tion law).
150 Far-fetched, but not impossible. One amicus brief to the Graham Court made this
point. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law at 10, Graham
(No. 609) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (stating that "[w]hen the
emergency arises and [a permanent resident] requires assistance, he is forced to emigrate
from Arizona to seek assistance elsewhere, thereby terminating his federally required pe-
riod of state residence for purposes of naturalization" under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)).
151 The Justices would not have been alone. See, e.g., Carrasco, supra note 146, at 631
(arguing that federal permission for state welfare discrimination against immigrants "is
inconsistent with the Naturalization Clause because it authorizes nonconformity within the
immigration policy of the United States"); Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A
Recommended Analysis, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 832, 832 n.2, 834 n.14 (1989).
152 On one occasion between the Graham decision and the enactment of the PRA, Con-
gress enacted a narrow provision permitting states to deny welfare benefits to a small class
of permanent residents. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
§ 201, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(h)(1) (1994)) (authorizing states to
deny financial or medical assistance for five years from date alien is granted "temporary
resident" status under amnesty provision and including aliens who adjust to permanent
resident status in less than five years pursuant to § 1255a(b)(1)(A)). Apparently no state
accepted this federal invitation to deny benefits to permanent residents, Carrasco, supra
note 146, at 596 n.23, but the hypothetical possibility led Professor Carrasco to examine the
rationale and offer additional theories in opposition to federal authorization of state anti-
immigrant classification, id. at 625 (suggesting that "ratchet theory" of Fourteenth Amend-
ment "precludes Congress from using its Section Five power to authorize states to deny
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tors advanced another significant analysis that could be applied to the
constitutional questions raised by federally authorized, state-imposed
alienage classifications.
This analysis arises from theories of membership in the national
community,153 which seek in part to resolve the tension between "ple-
nary power" principles and the imperative of national borders on the
one hand, and equality principles at stake in government regulation of
all persons within its borders on the other. They describe the case law
as reflecting a debate about the extent to which the power to regulate
membership in a national community can and should reach into the
civil, social, and economic lives of aliens present within a community's
borders; that is, to what extent "immigration law"-the direct regula-
tion of entrance and abode, with its attendant notions of extreme judi-
cial deference to legislative and executive action-is properly distinct
from "alienage law"-general civil, economic, and social regulation of
noncitizens, with its own attendant notions of equal personhood.1 A In
this view, cases involving immigrants are largely a dispute about classi-
fication: If a case is categorized as involving regulation of member-
ship and borders, anti-immigrant discrimination will be upheld as
legitimate; if the case is categorized as not involving membership and
borders, anti-immigrant discrimination will be invalidated as violative
of equality principles.' 55 Thus, one powerful insight of the member-
benefits to newly legalized aliens"); id. at 626-31 (suggesting that 1986 statute violates
"nondelegation doctrine"). Carrasco is no doubt correct that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not empower Congress to "dilute" the Fourteenth Amendments guar-
antee of equal protection, but I cannot imagine the government defending the PRA as
authorized by Section 5. As to the nondelegation doctrine, while it may not be quite so
"dead" as previously reported, cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Nos. 99-1257,99-1426,
2001 WL 182549, at *8-'*10 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2001) (reversing Court of Appeals determination
that portions of Clean Air Act violated nondelegation doctrine), it derives from "the prin-
ciple of separation of powers," Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989), and
"the nondelegation doctrine[ ] simply [is] not implicated by Congress's 'delegation' of
power to the states," Ky. Div., Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n v. Turfway Park
Racing Ass'n, 20 F.3d 1406, 1417 (6th Cir. 1994).
153 See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Martin & Motomura, supra note 46, at 194, 511-14; Bosniak,
supra note 54, at 1047; Martin, supra note 66, at 190-204; Michael Scaperlanda, Partial
Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 Iowa L Rev. 707 (1996);
Margaret Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous
Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 Hastings Const. LQ. 1087 (1995).
154 Bosniak, supra note 54, at 1087-1101.
155 For a particularly thoughtful examination of the theoretical underpinnings of this
approach, see Bosniak, supra note 54. Employing the work of political theorist Michael
Walzer, see Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality
(1983), Linda Bosniak contends that immigration and alienage cases are understood best
as reflecting "a deep uncertainty and conflict over the proper scope of the government's
authority to regulate membership .... The chronic question that drives the doctrine is
when and to what degree membership regulation properly subsumes matters of alien status
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ship theorists is that not "every federal regulation based on alienage is
necessarily sustainable as an exercise of the immigration power."' 156
This theoretical analysis is helpful in understanding the compet-
ing values underlying alienage jurisprudence, but important questions
regarding application of the theory remain largely unexplored. In ad-
dition, the approach essentially was rejected by a unanimous Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Diaz.157 In this Article, my purpose is to ask not
whether Mathews (or Graham) should be overruled, but rather,
whether devolution of the immigration power would be consistent
with an understanding of the Constitution that accepts the core hold-
ings of both Mathews and Graham. Moreover, even assuming Ma-
thews and its reasoning were not an obstacle to recognition of a
distinction between immigration and alienage law, there still would be
reasons to hesitate to adopt this approach.
First, it is not obvious that the theoretical distinction between
"immigration" and "alienage" law can supply a meaningful standard
in particular cases, since many laws regulating immigrants have fea-
tures of both regimes.' 58 For instance, a number of grounds of depor-
tation under the immigration laws press directly on the social and
economic behavior of legal immigrants: Under certain circumstances,
if a legal immigrant receives welfare benefits, 159 accepts employ-
beyond the border," Bosniak, supra note 54, at 1089. Bosniak identifies two broad re-
sponses to this conflict, which she terms the "separation" and "convergence" models:
[The former] supports a minimalist understanding of the scope of the govern-
ment's authority to regulate membership and urges a relatively strict separa-
tion between the membership domain and the domain of territorial
personhood. The other supports an expansive understanding of the proper do-
main of membership regulation and argues that membership concerns are
rightfully part of the regulation of social relationships among all territorially
present persons.
Id. at 1138.
156 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 Am.
J. Int'l L. 862, 869 (1989) (emphasis omitted); see also Rosberg, supra note 44, at 338
("[E]ven where the federal government is exercising its undeniable power to establish im-
migration policy... its power must still be confined within constitutional limits.").
157 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding restriction on eligibility of legal permanent residents
for Medicare Plan B, federal medical insurance program, after subjecting provision to
equivalent of rationality review); see also cases cited supra note 41.
158 While implicitly critical of the Court's ruling in Mathews, Bosniak does not attempt
to apply her theory to the Court's conclusion that denial of Medicare Plan B benefits to
newly arrived immigrants is (at least in part) a bona fide regulation of immigration and
national borders. See Bosniak, supra note 54, at 1101-10. Agreement on any guidelines
may not be possible absent consensus on the fundamental debate regarding the reach of
legitimate border regulation into the lives of territorially resident immigrants.
159 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5) (Supp. V 1999) ("Any alien who, within five years after the
date of entry, has become a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have
arisen since entry [is deportable].").
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ment, 160 engages in disfavored speech and associational activities, 1 61
commits certain criminal offenses,162 marries for reasons disapproved
of by the INS,163 or fails to maintain sufficient student status, 164 that
legal immigrant becomes deportable under the immigration laws.
Some of these categories of behavior also are regulated directly by the
federal government, in addition to the indirect regulation that follows
from threatening deportation if the immigrant engages in the listed
activity.165 It is not apparent what principle can distinguish as "immi-
gration" law the rule that says a legal immigrant who accepts public
benefits within five years of entry may be deportable, 166 from the
"alienage" law that outright denies certain public benefits to immi-
grants for the first five years after entry.167 So too with employment:
If employment without INS authorization renders an immigrant de-
portable and is therefore "immigration law,"1'6 why is a direct prohi-
bition on employment of certain immigrants merely "alienage
law"?1
69
A second reason that the immigration/alienage law distinction
may not provide a workable rule of decision, one of direct relevance
to judicial review of post-PRA state welfare laws, arises from a con-
sideration of institutional roles. That is, if Congress determines that
state welfare rules are an important element of border regulation, as it
160 Id. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (stating that nonimmigrant who "has failed .. to comply with
the conditions" of admission, such as prohibition on employment, is deportable).
161 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471 (1999)
(discussing deportation provisions regarding membership in designated organizations and
speech and associational activities relating to organizations designated as terrorist).
162 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).
163 Id. § 1227(a)(1)(G).
164 AADC, 525 U.S. at 473 (reviewing deportation proceedings for -failure to maintain
student status").
165 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (1994) (prohibiting employment of immigrants who
lack work authorization); id. § 1612(a)(1), (a)(3) (Supp. V 1999) (restricting eligibility of
legal immigrants for federal SSI and Food Stamps programs); Exec. Order No. 11,935, 5
C.F.R § 7A (2000) (prohibiting employment of all noncitizens in federal Civil Service, sub-
ject to limited exceptions on temporary basis), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 667.
166 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5).
167 Id. § 1613(a) (stating that qualified alien who enters United States on or after August
22, 1996 "is not eligible for any Federal means-tested public benefit for a period of 5 years
beginning on the date of the alien's entry"). In this regard, it also must be noted that
Congress chose to codify the PRA's immigrant provisions in Title 8 of the U.S. Code,
where the Immigration and Nationality Act is codified, rather than in Title 42, where many
federal welfare provisions appear.
168 See id. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) ("Any alien who was admitted as a nonimmigrant and who
has failed ... to comply with the conditions of such status, is deportable.").
169 See, e.g., id. § 1324a(a)(1) (1994) (prohibiting employment of aliens who lack work
authorization); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,99-105 (1976) (approving citizen-
ship requirement for federal civil service where government supplies rational basis).
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arguably declared in the preamble to the PRA170 and confirmed by
codifying the Act's immigrant restrictions in Title 8 of the U.S.
Code, 171 are courts competent to review that conclusion? Assume
Congress engages in legislative factfinding, concluding that manipula-
tion of certain incentives for entrance or continued abode, such as ac-
cess to employment 172 or public benefits, 73 play an important role in
regulating membership and borders. There is reason to question
whether the judiciary meaningfully could review such a finding.174 If
courts must defer to congressional (or executive) classification of a
particular regulation as an immigration rule, and if the judicial debate
is, as it seems, largely about classification, then the courts will cede
any role in these issues.
Certainly the Supreme Court has not embraced the "immigration
law vs. alienage law" distinction, and the unanimous decision in Ma-
thews arguably repudiates the position. To the extent that the differ-
ences between immigration and alienage law do underlie the
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court partially could accommodate the
tension between border regulation and equality principles by adopting
the nondevolution principle urged here, and thereby treat all state leg-
islation as necessarily "alienage" law. Thus, even if federal legislation
singling out legal immigrants is presumptively about border regulation
and entitled to judicial deference (except in cases which shock the ju-
170 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (Supp. V 1999).
171 See supra note 167.
172 Some have so stated. See, e.g., Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 1997)
("The primary purpose of the provision [8 U.S.C. § 1324a, prohibiting employment of un-
authorized aliens] was to reduce the flow of illegal immigration into the United States by
removing the employment 'magnet' that draws undocumented aliens into the country .... "
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 45-46, 56 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5649, 5649-50, 5660)); Aleinikoff, Martin & Motomura, supra note 46, at 602 ("Virtually all
scholars agree that economic factors provide the most common incentive for illegal entry
and residence .... ").
173 See, e.g., Borjas, supra note 105, at 105 ("[T]he empirical link between immigration
and welfare is indisputable."). Even scholars arguing for a liberalization of U.S. immigra-
tion policies have characterized welfare laws as an aspect of immigration lawmaking. See,
e.g., Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic Gains from the
Liberalized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 371, 390 (1998) ("A
country of immigration may implement a positive tariff on immigration... through restric-
tions on immigrant access to public entitlement programs.").
174 The contested standard for judicial review of legislative factfinding has been at the
center of some of the Supreme Court's recent federalism cases. Compare Bd. of Trs. v.
Garratt, No. 99-1240, 2001 WL 173556, at *8-*11 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2001) (holding that Con-
gress lacked sufficient evidence of disability discrimination to abrogate state sovereign im-
munity in Americans with Disabilities Act), with id. at *16 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("If any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain challenged legislation, then
there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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dicial conscience sufficiently to rebut the presumption' 75), state legis-
lation singling out legal immigrants is presumptively not about border
regulation and admission to membership, and must be justified. 176
If the Court has used federalism as a proxy for accommodating
the tension between border regulation and equality principles, then
the important effort by membership theorists to undermine the ex-
treme judicial deference to federal regulation of immigrants may not
be necessary to resolving the questions raised by the PRA's authoriza-
tion of state discrimination. In fact, both judicial deference to legisla-
tive immigration/alienage law classifications, and judicial scrutiny of
such classifications, present real practical difficulties. Excessive defer-
ence could permit Congress to distort constitutional jurisprudence
merely by claiming to act in furtherance of immigration policymak-
ing,177 but even moderate judicial scrutiny of the classification is also
problematic.17 No matter how coherent in theory, application of the
immigration/alienage distinction, at least to a statute like the PRA
which Congress itself has announced is an "immigration" law, is
problematic.
Iml
Ti NONDEVOLVABLE INM GRATION POWER
Commentators have argued that post-PRA state discrimination
against immigrants is invalid because Mathews v. Diaz was decided
175 The principal example may be Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), in
which the Supreme Court rejected the argument of the federal government that it could
imprison an alien at hard labor for violation of an immigration law, without providing a
trial by jury. Id. at 236-38; see also Bosniak, supra note 54, at 1097.
176 The "political function" cases, in which the Supreme Court upheld state alienage
classifications, may be understood as driven by legitimate concerns about admission to
membership in a state political community. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432
(1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978);
Bosniak, supra note 54, at 1112. However, the Court's determination of the scope of the
"political function" exception has been overly expansive. See Koh, supra note 44, at 83.
177 Imagine that Congress declared the establishment of affirmative action programs
served to attract talented, desirable immigrants of color or women immigrants, and there-
fore furthered critical immigration policies. Should courts defer to the classification as
"immigration law" and therefore the legislative choice? Or imagine the converse: Con-
gress abolishes affirmative action programs, declaring that such an action would serve to
attract talented, desirable white male immigrants who otherwise would not come to this
country, and therefore the abolition furthered critical immigration policies. Plainly, broad
judicial deference to Congress's conclusion that a particular statute is an immigration rule
would produce absurd results.
178 In addition to compelling courts to engage in extensive review of legislative factfind-
ing (as to whether, for example, the availability of certain public benefits or employment
opportunities in fact contributes to border regulation), there is no obvious constitutional
grounding for the theory and no constitutional standards to be applied.
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wrongly179 and because states who elect to discriminate remain sub-
ject to the rule of Graham v. Richardson, regardless of the PRA.180
But the principles of Mathews, a unanimous decision embraced by jus-
tices and judges across the ideological spectrum, t81 likely will remain
with us, and scholars have yet fully to explore the constitutional and
policy questions inherent in immigration devolution. In recognition of
these limitations, I propose an alternative analysis of federally ap-
proved, state-imposed immigrant discrimination. The analysis pro-
ceeds from two propositions. First, governmental discrimination
against immigrants, at any level and in any field, is offensive to bed-
rock equality principles and anticaste values embodied in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. l' 2 Second, the federal government is
empowered to regulate immigration because immigration lawmaking
can implicate foreign policy and national security concerns; 18 3 thus,
when the federal government exercises its immigration power, foreign
affairs considerations, to some extent, may be balanced with equality
principles in assessing the justification for that regulation. 184
Both of these propositions were applied in the welfare context in
unanimous decisions of the Burger Court, and both have endured for
decades. There is every reason to believe they will continue to last. If
they do, then the only possible defense of post-PRA state alienage
classifications will be that Congress has delegated its power to regu-
late immigration. 18 5 This question is dispositive because state alienage
classifications enacted pursuant to traditional police or spending pow-
179 See supra note 80.
180 See id.
181 The Mathews decision was joined without concurrence or dissent by everyone from
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun (who wrote many of the Court's modern deci-
sions invalidating state alienage classifications), to Justice Rehnquist (often the sole dis-
senter in the state alienage cases). The opinion is discussed supra notes 67-72 and
accompanying text. Lower courts also have applied the Mathews decision without hesita-
tion in a series of post-1996 challenges to new federal alienage classifications. See cases
cited supra note 41.
182 I take this to be the heart of Graham and its progeny.
183 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
184 1 view this as the core of Mathews, see supra notes 67-72, although I believe the
principle was applied wrongly in Mathews. Federal discrimination against immigrants
should be subject to heightened scrutiny, and the Medicare discrimination in Mathews
should not have passed this standard, even taking account of foreign affairs considerations.
185 See Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, The Rights of the Poor 121 n.224 (1997)
("[The PRA] delegates broad authority to fifty state governments to adopt fifty different,
uncoordinated, and inconsistent state policies toward immigrants, policies over which the
federal government has no control."); Wheeler, supra note 7, at 1255 (stating that constitu-
tional question raised by PRA is as follows: "[A]ssuming the provision of state public
benefits can be controlled by the federal government, as part of its foreign policy powers,
can the federal government delegate that authority to the states?").
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ers are subject to heightened scrutiny and generally invalid. 186 The
Court upheld anti-immigrant welfare discrimination in Mathews solely
on the grounds that the federal Medicare provisions were enacted (at
least in part) as an exercise of the federal immigration power.187 In-
deed, the Mathews Court took great pains to distinguish its holding
from that of Graham, emphasizing the different roles of the state and
federal government in regulating immigration. 188 Thus, if the states
have no original power to regulate immigration, 18 9 and federal anti-
immigrant welfare discrimination is constitutionally permissible only
as an exercise of the federal immigration power, then state anti-immi-
grant discrimination will survive if and only if Congress can devolve its
immigration power to the states.190 The Supreme Court previously
has employed structural arguments to resolve claims of individual
right involving immigrants. In several decisions, the Court has scruti-
nized carefully the government entity claiming to exercise the power
to regulate immigration and has invalidated devolutions contrary to
the constitutional architecture.' 91
This Part attempts to answer the devolvability question. It begins
with a review of the few Supreme Court comments on the topic, and
then proceeds to a close examination of the devolvability of the
186 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 344 (1971).
187 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-82 (1976).
188 Id. at 85.
189 See infra notes 193-204 and accompanying text.
190 That the PRA addresses preemption, a second and independent ground for decision
in Graham, see 403 U.S. at 376-80, is necessary but not sufficient to a defense of post-PRA
discrimination by the states.
191 The most famous example is probably INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), in which
the Court declared the legislative veto unconstitutional. Fundamental to the Court's rea-
soning in Chadha was the conviction that even when Congress exercises its "plenary immi-
gration power," the legislature is bound by the Constitution's other structural
requirements, there bicameralism and presentment. Id. at 952-55.
But of perhaps greater relevance to the devolvability question is the Court's opinion
in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), handed down the same day as
Mathews. In Mow Sun Wong, the Court invalidated federal Civil Service Commission reg-
ulations barring the employment of immigrants over the objections of the Civil Service
Commission that the citizenship requirement was justified "as an exercise of the plenary
federal power over immigration and naturalization." Id. at 99. The Court rejected this last
contention after concluding that the agency in fact was not authorized to exercise any im-
migration power. Id. at 114 ("[The Civil Service Commission] has no responsibility for
foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration quotas or conditions of
entry, or for naturalization policies .... ."); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and
Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 201,211-12 (1994) (noting that
in Mow Sun Wong, "the Court held that a federal interest in immigration and alienage
matters must be articulated by those who are institutionally competent to do so"). Shortly
after the Court's decision, President Gerald Ford issued an Executive Order establishing
an alienage classification substantially similar to that struck down in Mow Sun Wong.
Exec. Order No. 11,935, 5 C.F.R. § 7.4 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 667.
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sources of the unenumerated power to regulate immigration, as iden-
tified by the Supreme Court: the Naturalization Clause, the Foreign
Affairs Clauses, the Foreign Commerce Clause, and an extraconstitu-
tional theory of inherent national sovereignty. It also considers policy
arguments for and against treating the immigration power as devolv-
able. The section concludes that the immigration power is an exclu-
sively federal power which Congress may not, by statute, devolve to
the states.192
This conclusion indicates, therefore, that the PRA's attempt to
share federal power to regulate immigration with the states-the ef-
fort to label state legislative choices as an exercise in immigration law-
making-must fail. State discrimination against permanent residents,
in any field, remains subject to searching judicial review, and the oper-
ative equality principles may not be balanced with any considerations
of foreign affairs or national security. The PRA has not disturbed the
rule of Graham. State discrimination against permanent residents of-
fends core constitutional equality principles and is presumptively
invalid.
A. Judicial Statements on the Exclusivity of the Federal
Immigration Power
Since it discerned a federal power to regulate immigration in the
late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court consistently has described
this power as exclusively federal. In Chy Lung v. Freeman,193 for ex-
ample, the Court considered a California statute that empowered
state officials to examine noncitizens arriving at port and to impose an
onerous bond if the state official determined that the immigrant fell
within one of numerous classes of undesirable persons. 194 Writing in
1875, the Court invalidated the California statute, declaring: "The
passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects
of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the
States .195
192 In infra Part IV, I attempt to identify and answer possible objections to this
conclusion.
193 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
194 Id. at 277.
195 Id. at 280 (emphasis added); see also Henderson v. Wickham, 92 U.S. 259 (1875)
(invalidating state regulation of immigration). Both Chy Lung and Henderson followed
the Court's decision in The Passenger Cases (Smith v. Tumer), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283
(1849), which had invalidated as violative of the Foreign Commerce Clause state taxes on
the importation of immigrant passengers. The Court's decision in The Passenger Cases
represented something of a reversal of its earlier determination that a city rule regarding
importation of immigrant passengers was not unconstitutional. See Mayor of New York v.
Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). By the post-Civil War era, federal power in this regard
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A century later, the Court considered another California statute,
this one regulating employers of undocumented immigrants in De
Canas v. Bica.196 This time the Court left the California statute in
place-on the theory that states do have a degree of leeway to enact
general social and economic legislation regarding undocumented per-
sons' 97-but only after reminding the state that the "[p]ower to regu-
late immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power."1 8 In
the years between Chy Lung and De Canas, and since, the Court re-
peated this assertion many times. 199
Judicial declarations that the immigration power arises exclu-
sively at the federal level, however, do not address the question
whether the power may be transferred or delegated by Congress. On
at least one occasion the Court has stated that Congress may not share
or devolve the immigration power. Ironically, this was in the notori-
ous Chinese Exclusion Case,200 in which the Supreme Court declared
was unquestioned. See The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (upholding federal tax
on importation of immigrant passengers).
196 424 U.S. 351 (1976). The California statute at issue in De Canas subsequently %vas
preempted by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)
(1994).
197 De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355-56.
198 Id. at 354 (emphasis added). Even as to undocumented immigrants, moreover, a
state's power to legislate, and especially to discriminate, is limited. See Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (invalidating Texas law barring undocumented children from attend-
ing public schools as violative of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause).
199 See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 864 (19S2) ("The power
to regulate immigration-an attribute of sovereignty essential to the preservation of any
nation-has been entrusted by the Constitution to the political branches of the Federal
Government."); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1,10 (1982) ("Our cases have long recognized the
preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within
our borders."); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225 ("The States enjoy no power with respect to the
classification of aliens. This power is 'committed to the political branches of the Federal
Government."' (quoting Mathews v Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)) (citation omitted)); Ny-
quist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 n.8 (1977) ("Congress, as an aspect of its broad power over
immigration and naturalization, enjoys rights to distinguish among aliens that are not
shared by the States."); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) ("[Tihe
authority to control immigration is... vested solely in the Federal Government, rather
than the States.. .. "); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) ("[Tjhe responsibility for
regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been com-
mitted to the political branches of the Federal Government."); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948) ("The authority to control immigration-to admit or
exclude aliens-is vested solely in the Federal Government."); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 68 (1941) ("[T]he power to restrict, limit, regulate, and register aliens as a distinct
group is not an equal and continually existing concurrent power of state and nation, but
that whatever power a state may have is subordinate to supreme national law."); see also
Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, CJ.) (describing "sover-
eign powers over foreign relations, foreign commerce, citizenship, and immigration that
states and cities do not possess" (citation omitted)).
200 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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that the federal power to regulate immigration is "incapable of trans-
fer"201 and "cannot be granted away.1202 In contexts other than immi-
gration, the Court similarly has concluded that Congress may not
devolve exclusive federal powers to the States.
203
Thus, it is fair to say that to the extent the Supreme Court has
considered the nature of the immigration power, it has concluded re-
peatedly that the power is exclusively federal and "incapable of trans-
fer. ' '2°4 But these judicial statements have appeared in cases that did
not present squarely the question posed by the PRA: May Congress
devolve the immigration power by statute to the states?
B. Sources of the Immigration Power
The power to regulate immigration is not enumerated in the Con-
stitution. Over the years, the Supreme Court has located the power as
deriving "from various sources, '"205 including the Naturalization
Clause,20 6 the Foreign Affairs Clauses,207 the Foreign Commerce
Clause,20 8 and extraconstitutional theories of inherent national sover-
eignty.20 9 To date no Supreme Court decision has turned on the pre-
201 Id. at 609.
202 Id.
203 See Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 118 (1962) (noting past decisions in
which Court held that Congress may not devolve powers of maritime law); Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1920) (same); White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
646, 649 (1871) (noting that Congress may not authorize by statute violation of Contract
Clause); Van Allen v. Assessors, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573, 585 (1865) (recognizing that Con-
gress may not devolve taxation power). But see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
207 (1824) ("Although congress cannot enable a state to legislate, congress may adopt the
provisions of a state on any subject."); Henkin, supra note 33, at 433-34 n.56 ("Although
never overruled, it is unlikely that [Knickerbocker] still express[es] constitutional limits on
Congressional authority, since the Court later allowed Congress to adopt state law in other
areas" (citing Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), and Davis v. Dep't of
Labor & Indus., 317 U.S. 249 (1942))).
204 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
205 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982).
206 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
207 Id. art. I, § 8, cI. 10 ("To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.. .. "); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 ("To declare
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water .. "); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that President "shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties... and he shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors").
208 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
209 See, e.g., Toll, 458 U.S. at 10 (describing immigration power as arising from naturali-
zation, foreign commerce, and foreign affairs powers); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81
n.17 (1976) (listing sources of immigration power); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (describing immigration as inherent sovereign power). See
generally Aleinikoff, Martin & Motomura, supra note 46, at 185-95 (discussing sources of
federal immigration power).
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cise origin of the immigration power. Examination of the text,
structure, and history of each source, however, demonstrates that each
constituent element of the immigration power is an exclusively federal
power. That the sources of the immigration power are exclusively fed-
eral, and incapable of transfer to the states, strongly indicates that the
immigration power is itself an exclusively federal, nondevolvable
power.
1. Textual Sources
a. The Naturalization Clause. The Naturalization Clause em-
powers Congress "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization...
throughout the United States. '210 The Constitution does not in ex-
press terms forbid the States to exercise any naturalization author-
ity,21 but the textual requirement that there be a single naturalization
rule that is "uniform... throughout the United States" long has been
understood to establish an exclusively federal power, one which states
may neither exercise nor impede.2
12
Such has been the Supreme Court's view at least since 1817, when
Chief Justice Marshall declared: "That the power of naturalization is
exclusively in congress does not seem to be, and certainly ought not to
be, controverted. '213 Three years later, Justice Story elaborated, ex-
plaining that the powers affirmatively granted the federal government
by the Constitution
are never exclusive of similar powers existing in the States, unless
where the constitution has expressly in terms given an exclusive
power to Congress, or the exercise of a like power is prohibited to
the States, or there is a direct repugnancy or incompatibility in the
exercise of it by the States. The example .. of the third class, as
this Court have already held, [is] the power to establish an uniform
rule of naturalation... 214
210 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
211 Cf. id. art. I, § 10 (expressly forbidding States from engaging in certain activities,
without mention of naturalization).
212 See Michael T. Hertz, Limits to the Naturalization Power, 64 Geo. IJ. 1007, 1025
(1976) (arguing that naturalization is area "in which the state has no legitimate interest and
over which Congress has exclusive authority").
213 Chirac v. Chirae's Lessee, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 269 (1817) (declining to apply
Maryland statute that would have required French property owner to naturalize).
214 Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 49 (1820) (citing Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.)
at 269); see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701 (1898) ("The power,
granted to Congress by the Constitution, 'to establish an uniform rule of naturalization,
was long ago adjudged by this court to be vested exclusively in Congress."); Boyd %. Ne-
braska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 160 (1892) ("The Constitution has conferred on Con-
gress the right to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and this right is evidently
exclusive, and has always been held by this court to be so.").
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This has remained the Court's view through the modern period.21 5
That the naturalization power is exclusively federal is also sup-
ported by historical evidence, previously presented and only summa-
rized here.2 16 British restraints on naturalization and on immigration
to the American colonies appear as a grievance in the Declaration of
Independence. 17 The Articles of Confederation left the establish-
ment of naturalization rules to each state,218 resulting in divergent
standards.2 19 Because all states were bound to respect the "privileges
and immunities" of the "free inhabitants" of other states,220 frustra-
tion at the patchwork of state naturalization rules arose, particularly
within restrictionist states that resented the more generous naturaliza-
tion rules of some neighbors. Pennsylvania, for example, was accused
of having "chosen to receive all that would come there ... at the
expense of religion and good morals."122'
At the Constitutional Convention and during the ratification pe-
riod, there was apparently little debate over the desirability of estab-
lishing a national, uniform rule of naturalization,2 2 2 as even Anti-
Federalists seemed to agree that in this area a unitary national rule
had to prevail.223 In short, the Constitution's textual allocation of the
215 See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 10 (1977) ("Control over... naturalization
is entrusted exclusively to the Federal Government, and a State has no power to inter-
fere."); see also Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432, 435-36 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that naturali-
zation is exclusively federal power).
216 See Carrasco, supra note 146, at 631-32 (reviewing history of Naturalization Clause
and noting clear intent of Framers that naturalization would be exclusively federal power);
Hertz, supra note 212, at 1009-13 (same); Bennett, supra note 146, at 1704-05 (same).
217 The Declaration of Independence para. 9 (U.S. 1776) ("[King George III] has en-
deavoured to prevent the Population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws
for Naturalization of Foreigners; [and] refusing to pass others to encourage their migration
hither ...").
218 Articles of Confederation art. IV (1781).
219 The Federalist No. 42, at 269 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The
dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has long been remarked as a fault in our system,
and as laying a foundation for intricate and delicate questions ...."); Hertz, supra note
212, at 1009; Bennett, supra note 146, at 1704.
220 Articles of Confederation art. IV (1781).
221 Agrippa, Letter to the Massachusetts Gazette (Dec. 28, 1787), reprinted in Essays on
the Constitution of the United States 79, 79 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892), quoted in
Carrasco, supra note 146, at 631-32 n.204; see also Carrasco, supra note 146, at 631-32;
Hertz, supra note 212, at 1009.
222 Bennett, supra note 146, at 1705.
223 Carrasco, supra note 146, at 632; Hertz, supra note 212, at 1009-13; see also The
Federalist No. 32, at 198-99 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating
that naturalization power is "exclusively delegated" to federal government and that state
naturalization authority would be "absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant" to
constitutional scheme, for "if each State had power to prescribe a DISTINCT RULE, there
could not be a UNIFORM RULE"); The Federalist No. 42, at 269-71 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that "[lt]he dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization
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naturalization power exclusively to the federal government reflected a
purposeful, uncontroversial choice by the Framers, following logically
from a brief and unsatisfying experiment with disuniform state regula-
tion of naturalization under the Articles of Confederation.
The Supreme Court has never determined the precise contours or
operation of the uniformity requirement for naturalization, but the is-
sue has arisen before other federal courts. For instance, courts have
had to determine whether the federal statutory requirement that a
naturalization applicant be of "good moral character" should be inter-
preted with reference to disuniform state laws regarding adultery and
sodomy, or whether the Naturalization Clause's uniformity provision
instead demands the development of a federal common law of "good
moral character," without regard to state law.2 4 In this context, the
majority and better view has been that the constitutional command of
uniformity in naturalization compels the development of a federal
common law of "good moral character," lest the success of one's natu-
ralization application depend on the state in which it is submitted.2
One could counter that the uniformity requirement of the Natu-
ralization Clause should be interpreted to allow room for some state
role, because that is how the Supreme Court interpreted the uniform-
has long been remarked as a fault in our system," and so was necessary to remedy such
defects in Constitution).
224 See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring that naturalization appli-
cant be "a person of good moral character" from five years preceding date of application
through date of naturalization). A person who has admitted to or been convicted of cer-
tain crimes or other bad acts during the relevant period, or who has been convicted of an
"aggravated felony" at any time since November 1990, may be precluded from establishing
"good moral character." Id. § 1101(f). In 1981, Congress eliminated one provision that
had prompted federal courts to consider the propriety of incorporation of state law stan-
dards: the provision that had prohibited adulterers from establishing "good moral charac-
ter." Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L No. 97-116, § 2(c)(1),
95 Stat. 1611, 1611 (repealing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(2) (1976)).
225 See Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2000) (need for uniformity
in immigration law compels courts to develop federal common law of "burglary" as that
term is used in immigration statutes, rather than to incorporate divergent state criminal law
definitions). Compare Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1981) (rejecting reliance
on Virginia antisodomy statute to interpret "good moral character" requirement for natu-
ralization purposes, because "reference to laws which vary from state to state can only lead
to differing and often inconsistent results" and ignores "the constitutional mandate of uni-
formity in the area of naturalization"), Moon Ho Kim v. INS, 514 F.2d 179, 181 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (same, as to state law definitions of adultery), Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812,816-17
(9th Cir. 1964) (same, as to adultery), and In re Schroers, 336 F. Supp. 1348, 1349
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("[U]niformity... cannot be attained if resort is had to the laws of the 50
states to determine whether a particular applicant for citizenship has committed adul-
tery."), with Brea-Garcia v. INS, 531 F.2d 693, 696-98 (3d Cir. 1976) (disagreeing with
Wadman and Moon Ho Kim regarding need for uniform federal definition of "adultery" in
disregard of state law in deportation case).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 20011
HeinOnline -- 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535 2001
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause,226 in the case of Hanover
National Bank v. Moyses.227 There, the Court rejected a "uniformity"
challenge to an 1898 federal bankruptcy statute, which incorporated
dissimilar state bankruptcy exemptions. The Court reasoned that the
federal bankruptcy statute incorporated divergent state law in a uni-
form manner, and therefore "[t]he general operation of the law is uni-
form although it may result in certain particulars differently in
different States. ' 228 The Court has continued to adhere to the Moyses
understanding of uniformity in the bankruptcy context.229
Yet there are several reasons why one should hesitate to apply
the Moyses uniformity analysis to the Naturalization Clause. First, the
Moyses reasoning is less than compelling on its own terms, and it has
not been free of academic criticism. o30 In addition, it long has been
understood that the Constitution establishes concurrent, not exclusive,
federal authority over bankruptcy;231 in contrast, there appears to be
no suggestion, by judge or academic, that since the abandonment of
226 The Naturalization and Bankruptcy Clauses share the phrase "uniform ... through-
out the United States. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("To establish an uniform Rule of Natu-
ralization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States .... "). The proposal to combine these otherwise unrelated clauses originated with
the Committee on Style, apparently because of the linguistic rather than substantive rela-
tionship between the draft provisions. Hertz, supra note 212, at 1012.
227 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
228 Id. at 190; see also id. at 188 ("[U]niformity is geographical and not personal, and we
do not think that the provision of the act of 1898 as to exemptions is incompatible with the
rule.").
229 See Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corp. (Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases),
419 U.S. 102, 159 (1974) ("[T]he uniformity clause [in bankruptcy] was not intended to
hobble Congress by forcing it into nationwide enactments to deal with conditions calling
for remedy only in certain regions."); Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green,
329 U.S. 156, 172 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("To establish uniform laws of bank-
ruptcy does not mean wiping out the differences among the forty-eight States in their laws
governing commercial transactions."); Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank,
300 U.S. 440, 463 n.7 (1937) (noting that federal bankruptcy law accommodates different
state property laws).
230 See Judith Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination
of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 22, 101-06 (1983) (arguing
for rejection of Moyses doctrine and revival of spirit of uniformity as understood by Fram-
ers); Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Whether Illinois's Use of the Federal 'Opt Out' Pro-
vision Is Constitutional, 1981 S. Ii. U. L.J. 65, 72-73 (noting that debtor arguing for
application of true uniformity doctrine must establish that Moyses was decided incor-
rectly). The federal bankruptcy code continues the practice and permits a state "opt-out"
of default federal exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994).
231 See Moyses, 186 U.S. at 187 (claiming that Framers intended that "the States, in
surrendering the [bankruptcy] power, did so only if Congress chose to exercise it, but in the
absence of congressional legislation retained it"); see also Brown v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454,
457 (1892) ("So long as there is no national bankruptcy act, each state has full authority to
pass insolvent laws binding persons and property within its jurisdiction .... ").
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the Articles of Confederation, the states retain any concurrent author-
ity over naturalization.
Moreover, there is an important textual difference between the
two clauses. The Naturalization Clause employs the singular "Rule,"
providing for "an uniform Rule of Naturalization," but the Bank-
ruptcy Clause uses the plural "Laws," empowering Congress to estab-
lish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies. '"32 The textual
difference is consistent with evidence that the Framers intended dif-
ferent meanings for the singular naturalization "Rule" and the plural
bankruptcy "Laws."' 233 Finally, the phrase "uniform throughout the
United States" appears in one other clause in the Constitution, the
Taxation Clause, 2 4 and it has been interpreted there to require strict
geographic uniformity.
235
In short, constitutional text, structure, history, and precedent all
indicate that the naturalization power is an exclusively federal power,
and moreover one that may be exercised only in a manner that is geo-
graphically consistent across the nation. To the extent that the federal
immigration power arises from the Naturalization Clause, it too is re-
served constitutionally to the federal government.
b. The Foreign Affairs Clauses.26 The Supreme Court often
has spoken in sweeping terms of the federal government's exclusive
control of foreign affairs.23 7 Historical materials too support this
232 U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
233 Hertz, supra note 212, at 1012, 1015-17; cf. Akhuil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112
Harv. L. Rev. 747, 748-49 (1999) (describing mode of constitutional interpretation that
examines clauses in light of use of similar words and phrases elsewhere in document).
234 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts, and Excises... but all Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.").
235 See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83-109 (1900) (holding that uniformity require-
ment of Taxation Clause requires uniformity across geographic jurisdictions even if tax
itself was not "internally" uniform, that is, tax rate could be progressive or include exemp-
tions). The Knowlton view remains the modem one. See, e.g., United States v. Plasynski,
462 U.S. 74,84-85 (1983); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,583 (1937); Apache
Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (N.D. Tex. 198S), afi'd,
964 F.2d 1556 (5th Cir. 1992).
236 The separate proposition that the federal government's foreign affairs powers arise
in part from extraconstitutional, nontextual sources, and the theory's implications for the
devolvability of the federal immigration power, are discussed infra notes 288-305 and ac-
companying text.
237 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("Power over external affairs is
not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively."); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,331 (1937) ("[I]n respect of our foreign relations generally,
state lines disappear. As to such purpose the State... does not exist."): United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936) ("The Framers' Convention was
called and exerted its powers upon the irrefutable postulate that though the states were
several their people in respect of foreign affairs are one."); Chae Chan Ping v. United
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view.Z- 8 To the extent that the power to regulate immigration arises
from the foreign affairs powers, 39 therefore, the immigration power
would seem similarly to be reserved to the federal government.
The role of the states in foreign affairs has received relatively lit-
tle attention from the courts and commentators. 240 This no doubt re-
States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("For local interests the
several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with
foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power .... "); Holmes v. Jennison,
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575 (1840) ("It was one of the main objects of the constitution to
make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people, and one nation . ... ");
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 228 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) ("The States
are unknown to foreign nations .... "). As Henkin points out, "[e]ven in the Articles of
Confederation, the states had left themselves little independent authority in foreign rela-
tions." Henkin, supra note 33, at 149. That also was the case under the Constitution of the
Confederate States. Id. at 422 n.2.
238 See, e.g., The Federalist No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other
nations.").
239 See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,81 n.17
(1976).
240 On the states and foreign relations generally, see Henkin, supra note 33, at 149-69;
Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 Am. J. Int'l L.
821 (1989); Maier, supra note 151; John Norton Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations,
1965 Duke L.J. 248,297-319. Those few cases and commentaries that have examined issues
of federalism in foreign affairs fall into two broad categories: (1) those that evaluate the
rare attempts by states to exercise one of the few foreign affairs powers allowed them by
the Constitution, subject to congressional approval, and (2) those that consider the far
more common circumstance of an ordinary exercise of state power that may affect foreign
affairs and therefore be subject to a dormant foreign affairs preemption. See Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (holding that dormant foreign affairs preemption bars
application of Oregon escheat statute to putative East German heirs).
There is a significant literature concerning the proper scope of this dormant foreign
affairs preemption. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Constitu-
tionality of State and Local "Sanctions" Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State,
States' Affairs, or a Sorry State of Affairs?, 26 Hastings Const. L.Q. 307, 310-11 (1999)
(arguing that state and local sanctions on foreign countries are unconstitutional); David
Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in
the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 Vand, J. Transnat'l
L. 175, 179 (1997) (concluding that city and state sanctions on Myanmmar violate preemp-
tion doctrine); Shawna Fullerton, Note, State Foreign Policy: The Legitimacy of the Mas-
sachusetts Burma Law, 8 Minn. J. Global Trade 249, 260-64 (1999) (concluding that
Massachusetts Burma law runs afoul of preemption); Grace A. Jubinski, Note, State and
Municipal Governments React Against South African Apartheid: An Assessment of the
Constitutionality of the Divestment Campaign, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 543,572-75 (1985) (argu-
ing that state South Africa divestment legislation might not violate preemption doctrine);
Lori A. Martin, Comment, The Legality of Nuclear Free Zones, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 965, 965
(1988) (arguing that preemption doctrine is biggest obstacle to Nuclear Free Zones); Peter
J. Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the Federal
Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 Va. L. Rev. 813, 815 (1986) (concluding that local sanctions
against South Africa may be preempted). The Supreme Court sidestepped an opportunity
to revisit the topic of dormant foreign affairs preemption at the end of its last term. See
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2294 n.8 (2000).
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flects a longstanding consensus that the constitutional architecture
contemplates no significant state participation in foreign affairs.2 41
But in fact, the Constitution does recognize limited foreign affairs
powers to be exercised directly by the states, subject to the consent of
Congress2 42-a ready parallel to Congress's effort in the PRA to allow
the states to exercise an immigration power directly. The grant of
enumerated, conditional foreign affairs powers to the states, however,
strongly suggests that the Constitution contemplates no exercise of
unenumerated foreign affairs powers by the states, even with congres-
sional approval.
The Constitution confers no general "foreign affairs power" on
any branch of government. The text empowers Congress to declare
war and to define and punish offenses against the law of nations 43
and the Senate to advise and consent on the appointment of ambassa-
dors;244 the President is designated as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces and is authorized to make treaties, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and to send and receive ambassadors.2 45 Many
further foreign affairs powers are mentioned nowhere in the text, but
A related debate has arisen concerning the compatibility of federal courts' incorpora-
tion of customary international law (CIL) and federalism. See Bradley, supra note 33, at
402-09 (warning that greater power of treaties to preempt state law than that of Congress
could be used to overcome federalism restraints); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Posi-
tion, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 861-70 (1997) (arguing that CIL is not supreme over state law
unless incorporated into federal law by political branches); Goldsmith, supra note 33, at
1664-65 (arguing that absent action by federal political branches to incorporate CIL, inter-
pretation should be left to state courts); Spiro, supra note 33, at 1226 (calling for abandon-
ment of exclusivity principle, including inclusion of CIL in federal common law, as no
longer justified infringement on state authority). But see Flaherty, supra note 33, at 1280
(arguing that federal foreign affairs doctrine does and should trump prohibition against
federal government enlisting state officials); Harold H. Koh, Is International Law Really
State Law?, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1824, 1827 (1998) (challenging notion that federal courts
should not apply CIL without Congressional authorization as chaotic and not in spirit of
federalism).
241 See Henkin, supra note 33, at 149-51 (explaining that under U.S. Constitution, for-
eign affairs are national affairs, leaving states limited room for independent participation);
Moore, supra note 240, at 297 ("It is a generally accepted constitutional principle that the
states have no independent foreign affairs powers as such .... ).
242 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cls. 2-3 (permitting states, with consent of Congress, to
engage in war, enter into agreement or compact with foreign nation, lay certain duties or
imposts on exports, imports, and tonnage, and keep troops or ships of war in time of
peace).
243 Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 10-11.
244 Id. art. 1, § 2, ci. 2.
245 Id. art. II, §§ 2-3.
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have been implied from the text or derived from broader political the-
ories and extraconstitutional notions of inherent sovereignty.246
The Constitution also forbids the states to engage in certain for-
eign affairs activities, some absolutely and some conditionally. For ex-
ample, Article I, Section 10 provides that "[n]o State shall enter into
any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal. '247 On the other hand, the same section's third clause con-
tains a series of conditional prohibitions: "No State shall, without the
Consent of Congress . . . keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of
Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or
with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in
such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay."2 43
The text's specification of certain foreign affairs powers as the
domain of the President, the Senate, or the Congress, and its absolute
denial of other powers to the states, indicate that states are to have no
role in foreign affairs. But the conditional denial of yet other powers
to the states-particularly the Compact Clause, the only conditional
foreign affairs power yet exercised by a state249 -indicates other-
wise. °50 Indeed, the conditional denial of state authority in clause 3 of
Article I, Section 10 also must be read as a conditional grant of au-
thority, and at a minimum, reflects a textual contemplation of some
246 See Henkin, supra note 33, at 14-15 (identifying power "to regulate immigration" as
among the "missing" foreign relations powers that "were clearly intended for, and have
always been exercised by, the federal government"). Although the Foreign Commerce
Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, often is treated as a further source of a general foreign
affairs power, the Supreme Court has identified it as a discrete source of the immigration
power, see supra note 209, and for that reason I examine it separately, see infra notes 267-
85 and accompanying text.
247 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
248 Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
249 Congress has approved few formal compacts between a state and another nation.
Henkin, supra note 33, at 153 (listing examples); see also id. at 155 ("[S]tate and local
authorities have in fact entered into agreements and arrangements with foreign counter-
parts without seeking consent of Congress, principally on matters of common local interest,
such as the coordination of roads, police cooperation, [or] border control.").
250 One might contend as well that the Tenth Amendment's reservation to the states of
powers not conferred on the federal government demonstrates a textual basis for state
power to regulate immigration. The Supreme Court and commentators generally have not
suggested, however, that the gaps in the Constitution's enumeration of foreign affairs pow-
ers must be understood, in light of the Tenth Amendment, as leaving to the states all
unenumerated foreign affairs powers. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920)
(rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge to federal migratory bird treaty and implementing
statute, concluding that neither treaty nor statute "is forbidden by some invisible radiation
from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment").
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situations in which Congress may authorize the states to engage in
foreign affairs activity.25'
The Supreme Court has considered the Compact Clause in a case
involving a state and a foreign country only once. In Holmes v.
Jennison,5 2 an equally divided Court affirmed a ruling that the gover-
nor of Vermont was empowered to arrest a fugitive and extradite him
to Canada, despite the absence of any formal extradition treaty be-
tween the countries. The fugitive, Holmes, brought a petition for
habeas corpus, challenging the Governor's conduct as an unconstitu-
tional "agreement" with a foreign country to which Congress had not
consented.
Chief Justice Taney, writing for himself, Justice Story, and two
other Justices, agreed with Holmes that the Governor's arrangement
with Canada was an unauthorized "agreement," and therefore invalid.
Taney's opinion reflects a conviction that "[a]ll the powers which re-
late to our foreign intercourse are confided to the general [federal]
government, '' 2s3 and that because "the framers... anxiously desired
to cut off all connection or communication between a state and a for-
eign power: and we shall fail to execute that evident intention, unless
we give to the word 'agreement' its most extended signification.'"
4
The other four Justices, however, in four separate opinions, concluded
that the record did not establish the existence of an "agreement" re-
quiring congressional consent and upheld the extradition. -s5 Beyond
demonstrating a strong bias in favor of exclusive federal foreign af-
fairs power, however, Holmes v. Jennison does not clarify the scope of
state authority under the Compact Clause and its possible relation to a
congressional desire to authorize the states to regulate immigration.
The question remains: If the constitutional text expressly allows Con-
gress to authorize the states to engage in some foreign affairs activi-
ties, why cannot the PRA authorize the states to engage in regulation
of immigration, long considered an activity at least related to, if not
part of, foreign relations?
251 And if a state is empowered to enter into an "Agreement or Compact" with congres-
sional approval, then it presumably is empowered as well to negotiate with a foreign coun-
try to achieve an "Agreement or Compact." Henkin, supra note 33, at 156 n..
252 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
253 Id. at 570.
254 Id. at 572. In the alternative, Taney concluded that the extradition power was an
exclusively federal one and could not be exercised by the states at all. See id. at 574-79.
255 Id. at 581 (opinion of Thompson, J.); id. at 588 (opinion of Barbour, J.); id. at 596
(opinion of Catron, J.); id. at 619 (opinion of Baldwin, J.).
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One answer may be the canon of construction of negative impli-
cation:256 The expression of one area in which Congress may author-
ize state foreign affairs activity-Agreements and Compacts-implies
the exclusion of others. 5 7 Such an answer does not seem entirely fair,
however, as the immigration power is itself unenumerated, so one
hardly would expect a conditional grant to the states to be enumer-
ated. Moreover, the same canon could be applied as easily to the ab-
solute prohibitions of state foreign affairs activity enumerated in
Article I, Section 10, to argue that the expression of specified absolute
prohibitions implies the exclusion of any others (such as a prohibition
on state authority to regulate immigration).
258
On the other hand, to derive a negative implication from the con-
ditional grant of foreign affairs powers to the states would not be
unique. There are other powers granted to the federal government
that are neither expressly denied to the states,259 nor reserved to the
federal government in specific terms,260 but which nonetheless must
be exclusively federal. 261 For example, the Constitution empowers
256 See Felker v. Thrpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1996) (holding that provision of Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214, did not eliminate Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate original habeas corpus petitions
because Act explicitly barred certain modes of review but made no mention of original
petitions).
257 What sort of negative implications, if any, could be derived from the Compact Clause
was an aspect of the recent exchange regarding the constitutionality of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Compare Laurence Tribe, Taking Text and Struc-
ture Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108
Harv. L. Rev. 1221, 1270-71 (1995) (suggesting that Constitution's express grant of con-
gressional power to approve state compacts with foreign nations implies lack of similar
congressional power to approve executive agreements with foreign nations, outside ordi-
nary treaty approval requirements of Section 2 of Article II), with Bruce Ackerman &
David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 799, 919-20 (1995) (arguing
that Articles I and II present independent grants of power sufficient to create international
obligations). See generally Made in the U.S.A. Found. v. United States, No. 99-13138,
2001 WL 194857 (11th Cir. Feb. 27, 2001) (dismissing challenge to NAFTA as "treaty"
requiring Senate ratification on grounds that objection is nonjusticiable political question).
258 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 240, at 863 (stating:
[T]he natural inference is that Article I, Section 10's self-executing limitations
on state power in foreign relations are exhaustive and that other foreign rela-
tions activities fall within the concurrent authority of the state and federal gov-
ernments until the federal political branches exercise their foreign relations
powers in a manner that preempts state law.).
259 See U.S. Const. art I, § 10, cl. 1.
260 See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (requiring "an uniform Rule of Naturalization... throughout
the United States"); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (authorizing Congress to "exercise exchsive Legis-
lation" over military property and what could become District of Columbia (emphasis
added)).
261 See Tribe, supra note 257, at 1246 ("There are national responsibilities that simply
may not be delegated to the states.").
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Congress "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.'" 62
This power is nowhere denied to the states, nor reserved to the federal
government in the terms of its grant. Yet were Congress to pass a
statute devolving to the states the authority to establish lower federal
courts, it would be invalidated as inconsistent with the constitutional
structure and with the implication that such a power is exclusively,
nondevolvably federal.3
Another answer may be that, regardless of which precise foreign
affairs power gives rise to the immigration power, the Compact Clause
does not. Therefore, the conditional authority granted states by the
Compact Clause does not extend to federal authorization for state im-
migration policy. There is intuitive appeal to this answer, as one does
not think of federal immigration regulation as following principally
from international agreements,264 and it would not seem that much
state regulation of immigration would derive from a "compact" or
"agreement." But this explanation too is not completely satisfying, as
the immigration power of course cannot be traced to one or another
foreign affairs power in particular.
Perhaps the best that can be said of Article I, Section 10's limited,
conditional grant of foreign affairs power to the states is that it repre-
sents a small portion of the foreign affairs powers expressly contem-
plated by the constitutional text, and an even smaller portion of those
now understood to comprise the foreign affairs powers of the modem
nation. The plain text and structure of the Constitution contemplate
that the vast amount of the foreign affairs powers are lodged exclu-
sively at the federal level. This has long been the view of the Supreme
Court and authoritative commentators. 2 65 To the extent that the
power to regulate immigration arises from the Foreign Affairs
Clauses, it must arise elsewhere than from the limited Article I, Sec-
tion 10 carve-out for some federally approved, state-conducted for-
eign affairs activity.
262 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
263 See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 33, at 428 n33 ("Surely, constitutional provisions that
give Congress power to legislate in regard to U.S. courts... deny such power to the
states.").
264 There are important exceptions in the realms of refugee and asylum law, however.
See Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L 105-277, § 2242, 112
Stat. 2681, 2681-82 (implementing United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No.
100-20 (1988)); Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (implementing
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 268).
265 See Henkin, supra note 33, at 149-50 & 422 nn.1-2 (listing commentators).
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In short, the text of the Foreign Affairs Clauses, as interpreted by
courts and commentators, leaves no significant role for the states in
foreign relations. Nor does the Constitution's limited provision for
federally approved state involvement in foreign affairs, in narrow,
specified areas, allow for federally authorized state involvement in im-
migration policymaking. If the immigration power arises from the
Foreign Affairs Clauses, then it may be exercised exclusively by the
federal government and may not be devolved to the states.
266
c. The Foreign Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court initially
derived the power to regulate immigration from Congress's authority
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations. 2 67 Can the foreign
266 A word about the contemporary debate regarding "dormant" foreign affairs preemp-
tion is appropriate, if only to distinguish that discussion from the issues raised by an at-
tempted devolution of the federal immigration power. The more common circumstance in
which federalism concerns arise in foreign affairs occurs when a state or local authority
exercises ordinary police or spending powers in a way that directly or potentially affects
national foreign policy. The courts have dealt with state intrusion into foreign affairs by
applying a preemption doctrine, which in its most expansive form embraces a broad "dor-
mant" foreign affairs preemption. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942)
(asserting that "[p]ower over external affairs" lies in national, rather than state, govern-
mental focus); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) ("Governmental power
over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national govern-
ment."). The most forceful statement of this "dormant" foreign affairs preemption appears
in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), where the Supreme Court held that application
of an Oregon escheat statute to putative East German heirs was an impermissible "intru-
sion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the
President and Congress," id. at 432, notwithstanding the U.S. government's disclaimer of
any contention that "'application of the Oregon escheat statute in the circumstances of this
case unduly interferes with the United States' conduct of foreign relations,"' id. at 434
(quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 6 n.5, Zschernig (No. 21)).
Academic commentators recently have mounted a challenge to Zschernig's muscular
notion of a "dormant" foreign affairs preemption. See supra notes 33-34, 240. As recently
as 1999, the First Circuit applied Zschernig to invalidate a Massachusetts law barring state
procurement from companies that do business with Burma. See Nat'l Foreign Trade Coun-
cil v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds,
but declined an express invitation to revisit Zschernig. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (holding that state law was preempted specifically by fed-
eral Burma statute). The outcome of the debate on the scope or extent of "dormant"
foreign affairs preemption ultimately will not be that significant, though, in assessing the
legitimacy of the PRA's express devolution of the federal immigration power. In the
Zschernig debate, even proponents of a new "foreign affairs federalism" have not argued
that a state's participation in foreign policymaking reflects a constitutional devolution of
the foreign affairs powers, or that state action affecting foreign policy must now be treated
with the same judicial deference as federal action. Rather, they advance the much more
limited claim that courts should hesitate to hold preempted all ordinary exercises of state
power that happen to touch on foreign affairs, where no express conflict exists.
267 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 600 (1884)
("Congress ha[s] the power to pass a law regulating immigration as a part of the commerce
of this country with foreign nations .. "); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1876)
("The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign na-
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commerce power, and therefore by implication, the immigration
power also, be devolved to the states?
Unlike the Naturalization Clause, there is no textual restriction
on the exercise of a foreign commerce power by the states 268 Indeed,
at first glance, one might suppose that like its cousin, the Interstate
Commerce Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause was intended to es-
tablish concurrent jurisdiction in the state and federal governments.2 69
The Supreme Court, however, long has recognized a profound
distinction between the federal government's concurrent authority to
regulate interstate commerce and its "exclusive and absolute" power
over foreign commerce.270 The Court's authoritative modem state-
ment on the federal power to regulate foreign commerce appears in
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,271 in which the Court in-
validated a California ad valorem tax on shipping containers as viola-
tive of the Foreign Commerce Clause. Writing for the Court two
tions to our shore belongs to Congress .... [it has the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations .... "); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270 (1876); The
Passenger Cases (Smith v. Turner), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 400 (1849) (attributing to Con-
gress power to regulate foreign commerce); Bilder, supra note 51, at 745-47 (noting that,
until 1889, Court based immigration jurisprudence on Commerce Clause).
268 The U.S. Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing it's [sic] inspection Laws." U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. Like the
Compact Clause, id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, this provision is both a prohibition on the States and a
conditional grant of authority to act, see generally Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S.
276 (1976). I am not aware that the suggestion has been made that the immigration power
arises from the Import-Export Clause. Like the Compact Clause, this narrow grant of
power to the states to participate in the regulation of foreign commerce is not significant in
evaluating whether the broad federal power to regulate foreign commerce may be de-
volved to the states. See supra notes 250-64 and accompanying text. If anything, the spe-
cific enumeration of a narrow area for federally authorized state regulation implies that the
states possess no other direct power in foreign commerce.
269 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress shall have power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States").
270 See Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470,492 (1904) (noting that regardless of debate
regarding scope of Congress's interstate commerce power, "it is not to be doubted that
from the beginning Congress has exercised a plenary power in respect to the exclusion of
merchandise brought from foreign countries"). This view was echoed in Bowmnan v. Chi. &
Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888):
Laws which concern the exterior relations of the United States with other na-
tions and governments are general in their nature, and should proceed exclu-
sively from the legislative authority of the nation. The organization of our
state and federal system of government is such that the people of the several
states can have no relations with foreign powers in respect to commerce or any
other subject, except through the government of the United States .... The
same necessity perhaps does not exist equally in reference to commerce among
the states.
Id. at 482; see also Henderson, 92 U.S. at 273.
271 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
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years earlier, Justice Blackmun had explained that a state tax does not
burden interstate commerce impermissibly if it satisfies four crite-
ria.272 The issue in Japan Line was whether satisfaction of the four
interstate commerce requirements alone would render California's tax
permissible under the Foreign Commerce Clause.273
Again writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun concluded that
"there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign
commerce power to be [ ] greater" than that of the Interstate Com-
merce Clause, and "[c]ases of this Court, stressing the need for uni-
formity in treating with other nations, echo this distinction.
'"2 74
Accordingly, cases involving the Foreign Commerce Clause require "a
more extensive constitutional inquiry, 2 75 in which a court must con-
sider two additional criteria: whether a state tax creates a substantial
risk of international multiple taxation, and "whether the tax prevents
the Federal Government from 'speaking with one voice when regulat-
ing commercial relations with foreign governments."' 2 76 The Court
concluded that the California tax at issue in Japan Line failed on both
prongs: It resulted in international multiple taxation and "prevent[ed]
this Nation from 'speaking with one voice' in regulating foreign
trade." 277
The constitutional mandate that the nation "speak with one
voice" in foreign commerce would seem contrary to any assertion that
Congress could devolve the power to the states. But Congressional
approval of a state regulation can satisfy the "one voice" requirement
of Japan Line, as implied by the Japan Line Court's alternate phrasing
of the inquiry as whether a state regulation would impair federal uni-
formity "in an area where federal uniformity is essential. '278 Thus, in
three leading foreign commerce cases since Japan Line, satisfaction of
the "one voice" criteria has depended on a determination whether
Congress considered federal uniformity sufficiently "essential" to
272 The Court held that a state tax does not violate the Interstate Commerce Clause if it
"is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly appor-
tioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the ser-
vices provided by the State." Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279
(1977).
273 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445.
274 Id. at 448.
275 Id. at 445-46.
276 Id. at 451. The reference to the federal government's need to "speak with one voice"
is to Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976), a case arising under the Ex-
port-Import Clause.
277 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452. The Court also offered a less absolute formulation of
the "one voice" requirement, defining the inquiry as whether a state regulation would "im-
pair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential." Id. at 448.
278 Id.
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have demonstrated an intention to prohibit irregular state regula-
tion.279 Commentators generally agree that current foreign commerce
jurisprudence enables Congress to approve state regulation of foreign
commerce "in ways that would not stand were Congress silent."280
The Supreme Court's "one voice" Foreign Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence is essentially a jurisprudence of preemption, in which the
Court scrutinizes state regulation of foreign commerce for compatibil-
ity with federal goals. In its most recent cases, the Court has been
reluctant to find an incompatibility. a1 But the issue raised by the
PRA is not whether post-1996 state alienage classifications violate the
Foreign Commerce Clause . 3 Rather, it is whether Congress may de-
volve the federal immigration power to the states, and with it the sub-
stantial immunity from judicial review that attends its exercise. The
modem foreign commerce cases do not consider whether Congress
may delegate its own foreign commerce powers; they assume a con-
279 In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983), the
Court rejected a Foreign Commerce Clause challenge to the use of California's "worldwide
combined reporting" method to determine the franchise tax owed by a domestic corpora-
tion with foreign subsidiaries. The Court's analysis of the "one voice" criteria hinged on its
conclusion that there were no "specific indications of congressional intent" to preempt
California's scheme. Id. at 196-97. In Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Rev-
enue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986), the Court rejected a "one voice" challenge to a Florida tax on the
sale of fuel to common carriers, including airlines. Even though the United States as ami-
cus curiae contended that Florida's regime undermined the nation's ability to speak with
one voice, the Court disagreed, perceiving no clear demonstration of a federal policy
against state sales taxation of airplane fuel. Id. at 9. Finally, returning to California's
franchise tax in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298 (1994), the Court
again upheld the state scheme, this time as applied to a foreign corporation and a domestic
corporation with a foreign parent. Again, because the Court could "discern no 'specific
indications of congressional intent' to bar the state action," the Court concluded that the
"one voice" requirement was not violated. Id. at 324.
280 Henkin, supra note 33, at 162; see also Tribe, supra note 257, at 1151-52 ("he Su-
preme Court, in the face of congressional silence, has allowed only such state action [regu-
lating foreign commerce] as it has deemed consistent with the nationality policies
perceived to underlie the congressional power delegated in the Commerce Clause itself.").
Some scholars recently have criticized the scope of "dormant" foreign commerce pre-
emption. See Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 1681-90 (condemning doctrine of dormant for-
eign commerce preemption as unnecessary and harmful); Spiro, supra note 33, at 1266
(applauding Barclays Bank decision as "bod[ing] ill for 'one-voice' jurisprudence"); Peter
Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 Va. J. Int'l L 121,
164 (1994) (criticizing Barclays Bank decision for stressing "the institutional preeminence
of Congress over foreign commerce" rather than taking "full account of the possibility of
foreign government retaliation").
281 See Barclays Bank PLC, 512 U.S. at 324; Wardair Can., Inc., 477 U.S. at 12;
Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 197.
282 Actually, they might, even if the PRA satisfies the "one voice" requirement by mani-
festing a congressional determination that this is not "an area [of commercial activity]
where federal uniformity is essential." Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448. This is because state
anti-immigrant discrimination may violate a different requirement, the nondiscrimination
prong of Complete Auto Transit, by disfavoring foreign immigration (or commerce).
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current state power to regulate commerce generally. The decisions
therefore do not shed much light on whether, if the federal immigra-
tion power emanates from the Foreign Commerce Clause, it may be
devolved to the states.
Yet there are reasons to conclude that Congress may not devolve
its power to regulate foreign commerce to the states, nor any immigra-
tion power that may arise from it. Certainly any argument for
devolvability would contradict the Court's longstanding conviction
that the foreign commerce power is the "exclusive and absolute" do-
main of the federal government.283 The argument also would contra-
dict the more modem characterization of the power to regulate
foreign commerce as merely an aspect of the broad power to regulate
foreign affairs, the devolution of which, as discussed above, should not
be tolerated.28 4 Finally, it is noteworthy that even opponents of "dor-
mant foreign commerce preemption" have not suggested that states
possess an independent power to regulate foreign commerce; theirs is
the narrower claim that a state's otherwise constitutional regulation of
all commerce should not be invalidated simply because the regulation
also applies to international commerce.285
In sum, consideration of the three textual provisions identified by
the Supreme Court as giving rise to the immigration power-the Nat-
uralization, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Commerce Clauses-indi-
cates that the powers therein conferred are exclusively federal and not
devolvable to the states by statute. The evidence is not unequivocal,
as the constitutional text does contemplate some limited, direct exer-
cise of these powers by the states, as in the Compact Clause and the
Import-Export Clause. These textual exceptions are narrow, however,
and serve to confirm the rule against state power and against the ca-
pacity of the federal government to authorize by statute state exercise
of these powers. In addition, the conclusion that the immigration
power is "truly national" 86 and incapable of devolution to the states
would not render the power uniquely so.287 To the extent, therefore,
that the federal immigration power arises from one or more of these
textual sources, it would appear that the PRA's attempted devolution,
283 Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 493 (1904); see also Bowman v. Chi. & North-
west Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 482 (1888) ("The organization of our state and Federal system
of government is such that the people of the several States can have no relations with
foreign powers in respect to commerce ....").
284 See supra notes 237-66 and accompanying text.
285 See supra note 280.
286 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 676 (2000).
287 See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
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along with the attendant judicial deference to exercises of the immi-
gration power, is impermissible.
2. Extraconstitutional Sources of the Immigration Power
The difficulty of extrapolating the full immigration power from
the text of the Naturalization, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Commerce
Clauses, however, has led the Supreme Court to propose that the fed-
eral immigration power may arise as well from an extraconstitutional
source: the inherent sovereignty of the nation. The Court first articu-
lated this theory in the notorious Chinese Exclusion Case,2ss repeated
it in other early cases,289 and the doctrine soon was entrenched
29 0
The Supreme Court rarely has analyzed the theory of an ex-
traconstitutional or inherent sovereignty as a source of the immigra-
tion power.291 That analysis has appeared, rather, in judicial and
288 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). The Court stated:
That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative
department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do
not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent
is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If
it could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of
another power .... The power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of
sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of
those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution ....
Id. at 603-04, 609.
Sarah Cleveland has pointed out that the inherent sovereignty theory's antecedents
also include decisions involving regulation of Native American affairs. Sarah Cleveland,
The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. Colo. L Rev. 1127, 1135-42
(1999).
289 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-08 (1893) (citing numer-
ous international law commentators for proposition that right to "expel or deport foreign-
ers" is "essential attribute[ ] of sovereignty" (citations omitted)); Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) ("It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preserva-
tion, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions .... In the United States this
power is vested in the national government .... ).
290 The notion that the power to regulate immigration is an incident of sovereignty pre-
dates this nation. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 288, at 1143 ("Citing Vattel's works on
international law, the Federalists argued [in 17981 that because the law of nations recog-
nized the absolute right of a nation to expel aliens, the Alien Act... violated no constitu-
tional provisions.").
291 Early criticism by some dissenting Justices, who insisted that all federal authority
must derive from the constitutional text, soon faded. For example, in Fong Yue Ting, Jus-
tice Field stated in dissent:
The government of the United States is one of limited and delegated pow-
ers .... When, therefore, power is exercised by Congress, authority for it must
be found in express terms in the Constitution, or in the means necessary or
proper for the execution of the power expressed. If it cannot be thus found, it
does not exist.
149 U.S. at 757-58 (Field, J., dissenting); see also id. at 737 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (-It is
said that the power here asserted is inherent in sovereignty. This doctrine ... is one both
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academic discussion of the related notion that the federal government
possesses some foreign affairs powers "not rooted in the Constitution,
but inherent in the nationhood and sovereignty of the United
States. '292 Given the consistent reference in the foreign affairs cases
to immigration cases citing inherent sovereignty, it seems likely that
the Supreme Court would apply its broader analysis of inherent sover-
eignty and foreign affairs to the specific context of immigration. Thus,
analysis of the foreign affairs "sovereignty" cases should inform the
inquiry regarding devolvability of the federal government's inherent
immigration power.
The Court's principal statement of the view that foreign affairs
powers are sovereign powers appears in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Co. 293 In that case, a joint resolution of Congress had
empowered the President to declare an arms embargo on countries
involved in fighting in the Chaco region of South America, with viola-
tions punishable as criminal acts. President Roosevelt declared an
embargo, and the Curtiss-Wright defendants were indicted for con-
spiring to sell arms to Bolivia. They defended on the grounds that the
joint resolution was an improper delegation of legislative power to the
executive branch.
Writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland rejected the defendants'
nondelegation argument with a sweeping theory: "The broad state-
ment that the federal government can exercise no powers except those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers
as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated pow-
ers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs. '294 In
foreign affairs, the Constitution did not redistribute powers between
the federal government and states because "the states severally never
possessed international powers. ' 295 Rather,
indefinite and dangerous."). Yet the modem Court's tendency to emphasize constitutional
text as the source of the immigration power may reflect an enduring unease with a full-
throated doctrine of extraconstitutional authority. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 11
(1982) (declaring that federal immigration power is "constitutionally derived" and that
"[t]he Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens
shall be admitted to the United States" (emphasis added) (citing Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 418-19 (1948))); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 (1976)
("The Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens
shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their
conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization." (em-
phasis added) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941))).
292 Henkin, supra note 33, at 15-16 & 328 n.3 (gathering sources).
293 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
294 Id. at 315-16.
295 Id. at 316.
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[a]s a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies
acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the
Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their col-
lective and corporate capacity as the United States of America ....
When, therefore, the external sovereignty of Great Britain in re-
spect of the colonies ceased, it immediately passed to the Union. 96
In light of this transfer of sovereign powers directly from Great Brit-
ain to the new federal government, "[i]t results that the investment of
the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did
not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.'" 97
Among the unenumerated powers incident to national sovereignty,
Justice Sutherland listed the power to acquire territory by discovery
and occupation, "the power to expel undesirable aliens,"29s and the
power to make international agreements that do not amount to "trea-
ties" in the constitutional sense.299
The Curtiss-Wright theory of extraconstitutional foreign affairs
powers inherent in national sovereignty is the subject of a substantial
literature,300 but what is significant for the instant inquiry is whether,
assuming the theory's validity, Congress and the President may by
statute devolve to the states some part of that inherent sovereignty
which gives rise to the federal immigration power. As to this ques-
tion, it seems difficult categorically to answer in the negative, for "in-
herent sovereignty" is a theory of international law and political
philosophy,301 ungrounded in the normal legal interpretive sources of
text, structure, and history.302
296 Id. at 316-17.
297 Id. at 318.
298 Id. (citing Fong Yue img v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)).
299 Id. (citing B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912)).
300 See Henkin, supra note 33, at 329 nn.9-10 (listing commentary critical of Suther-
land's theory); id. at 20 ("Students of the Constitution may have to accept Sutherland's
theory, with its difficulties, or leave constitutional deficiencies unrepaired."). Cleveland
has demonstrated that Justice Sutherland's theory of an extraconstitutional, plenary for-
eign affairs power had "roots deep into the early nineteenth century, particularly in judicial
decisions relating to Indians, aliens, and territories." Cleveland, supra note 288, at 1135.
301 See Emmerich Vattel, The Law of Nations 169-70 (Joseph Chitty ed., Philadelphia, T.
& J.W. Johnson 1858) ("The sovereign may forbid the entrance of his territory either to
foreigners in general or in particular cases, or to certain persons or for certain particular
purposes, according as he may think it advantageous to the state.").
302 Louis Henkin explains that international law restricts the exercise of all foreign af-
fairs powers, including "inherent" powers recognized under Sutherland's theory. Henkin,
supra note 33, at 20. Others specifically have argued that international law limits the sover-
eign immigration powers of the federal government in some respects, such as in the treat-
ment of refugees and asylum seekers. See, e.g., James A.R. Nafziger, The General
Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 Am. J. Int'l L. 804 (1983); Michael
Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wisc. L. Rev. 965. I am unaware,
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2001]
HeinOnline -- 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 551 2001
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Certainly, by Sutherland's own definition, powers incident to the
nation's sovereignty are exclusively federal powers. It would seem to
follow that only the sovereign can exercise sovereign powers, for
transfer or devolution of such powers is a surrender of sovereignty
itself. After all, Sutherland's own example of a transfer of sovereign
powers was British recognition of the colonies' independence and re-
constitution as the United States.303 Under Curtiss-Wright, then, one
sovereign may surrender inherent power to another sovereign. But
any congressional attempt to devolve inherent powers to nonsover-
eign states would be incompatible with the very creation of the United
States "in their collective and corporate capacity. ' '304
It is not possible, of course, to point to definitive text, history, or
precedent denying Congress's power to devolve powers inherent in
national sovereignty, and hence the conclusion that sovereign powers
can be exercised only by the sovereign is at best a natural, not inevita-
ble, implication of Curtiss-Wright. But if the power to regulate immi-
gration truly derives from some fundamental attribute of sovereignty,
relinquishment of that power must be tantamount to relinquishment
of sovereignty. 30 5 Such a basic reordering of our constitutional archi-
tecture, and of the very Union of the states, is not achievable by stat-
ute. If the PRA sought to devolve an immigration power arising from
our nation's sovereignty, that devolution must be a nullity.
C. Policy Considerations
In addition to immigration law precedent and the text, history,
and structure of the constituent elements of the immigration power,
there are sound policy reasons favoring a conclusion that the federal
immigration power should not be capable of devolution by statute. It
seems obvious that states should not, as a matter of policy, engage in
classic immigration lawmaking-a federal statute empowering the
states to erect border crossings, issue visas, or proscribe fifty different
grounds for deportation plainly would be unwise, inefficient, and
likely to draw the nation into international disputes based on the ac-
tions of individual states.3 06 Yet if the immigration power extends to
less direct regulation of entrance and abode, encompassing laws such
however, of any principle of international law specifically limiting the devolution of sover-
eign powers.
303 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936).
304 Id.
305 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609
(1889).
306 Recall the unhappy experiment in state control of naturalization rules under the Ar-
ticles of Confederation, see supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
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as employment and welfare rules affecting immigrants, 30 7 is devolu-
tion still misguided? Why not allow Congress to devolve at least that
portion of the immigration power that regulates the socioeconomic
lives of immigrants, and let states wishing to exercise the delegated
power do so?
There are several reasons. Most importantly, devolution would
erode the antidiscrimination and anticaste principles that are at the
heart of our Constitution and that long have protected noncitizens at
the subfederal level 30 8 The plenary power doctrine of immigration
law inevitably shields governmental action from the level of judicial
scrutiny that ordinarily would be applied, distorting constitutional ju-
risprudence and countenancing what otherwise would be invalidated
as arbitrary or discriminatory government behavior.30 9 Permitting
devolution would amplify this distortion, privileging the plenary
power doctrine over equal protection norms at the state and local
level. Given the choice, one should reject a constitutional theory that
endorses the creation of state and local laboratories of bigotry against
immigrants.
If devolution were permissible, the corrosive effects of the ple-
nary power doctrine on equality norms would not necessarily be lim-
ited to the realm of welfare rules. These same norms generally have
invalidated state anti-immigrant employment restrictions,3 1 0 although
as with the welfare cases, identical employment classifications have
been upheld at the federal level.31' Devolution of the immigration
power might enable Congress by statute to authorize the states to re-
307 As noted previously, membership theorists have criticized this broad interpretation
of the immigration power, but the proposed distinction between -immigration" and -alien-
age" law may not be workable in application. See supra notes 158-74 and accompanying
text. Moreover, Mathews v. Diaz and its progeny represent a failure to embrace this dis-
tinction. My task in this Article is to ask whether, even assuming the continuing validity of
Mathews, devolution of the immigration power is violative of the Constitution.
308 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment and the laws adopted under its authority thus embody a general policy that all
persons lawfully in this country shall abide 'in any state' on an equality of privileges with
all citizens under nondiscriminatory laws."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,369 (1886)
('The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of
citizens .... [Its] provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality .... ).
309 See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (hold-
ing that INS does not violate First Amendment when it engages in selective enforcement of
immigration laws based on disfavored speech or associational activities of noncitizens);
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (upholding sex discrimination in immigration statute).
310 See cases cited supra note 12.
311 Compare Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (invalidating citizenship require-
ment for state civil service), with Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9h Cir. 1980)
(upholding citizenship requirement for federal civil service).
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strict the employment opportunities of legal immigrants, by barring
access to public jobs and commercial licenses necessary for private
employment.312 Immigrant access to education, largely a matter of
state and local concern, also might be at risk were devolution permis-
sible, as equal protection norms have invalidated state or local restric-
tions on immigrant access to student financial aid313 and free primary
and secondary education.
314
Together, decades of decisions regarding employment, education,
and public benefits for permanent residents to a great degree have
guaranteed equal treatment under law for millions of noncitizens in
this country. The decisions reveal a recurring state and local impulse
to enact anti-immigrant socioeconomic legislation. 315 But the equality
principles prohibiting these measures are sound: Legal distinctions
between citizens and permanent residents are rarely justifiable.316 As
a policy matter, devolution should be rejected to preserve the vitality
of equality principles at the subfederal level.
One should also be concerned about the possibility of a race-to-
the-bottom among states.317 Whether prompted by nativism or a
stated desire to conserve fiscal resources for citizens, the enactment of
state or local alienage classifications under a devolvability doctrine
also could be accelerated by such a competition. It remains to be seen
whether the absence of such a competition since the PRA's enactment
is a result of temporary factors such as a robust economy and the
PRA's initial windfall to the states, or of more enduring factors.
312 "Might," because 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), which prohibits alienage discrimination in
contracting, should nevertheless limit public and private employment discrimination on the
basis of citizenship. See Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419-20.
313 Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (invalidating state restriction on student aid to
legal permanent residents). The Supreme Court also struck down a restriction on immi-
grant eligibility for in-state tuition rates, although in that instance the Court's rationale
rested on preemption grounds. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 1 (1982).
314 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (invalidating denial of free public primary and
secondary education to undocumented children).
315 Devolution's threat to the civil liberties of immigrants would not necessarily be lim-
ited to equality norms; noncitizens' freedom of speech, for example, might be at risk. Con-
gress has debated but not approved restrictions on campaign contributions by permanent
residents. See, e.g., Note, Campaigns, Contributions and Citizenship: The First Amend-
ment Right of Resident Aliens to Finance Federal Elections, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 771 (1997);
Note, "Foreign" Campaign Contributions and the First Amendment, 110 Harv. L. Rev.
1886 (1997). Devolution might permit states to enact their own immigrant-specific limits.
316 See supra Part I.A.2.
317 See Borjas, supra note 105, at 118 ("[T]he main immigrant-receiving state will soon
be leading the 'race to the bottom,' as they attempt to minimize the fiscal burden imposed
by the purposive clustering of immigrants in those states that provide the highest bene-
fits."); Fix & Tumlin, supra note 7, at 4 ("Devolution of immigrant policy-like other areas
of social welfare policy-also invokes the specter of a race to the bottom.").
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Moreover, there are reasons to be particularly concerned about
anti-immigrant discrimination at the state or local level. Subfederal
alienage classifications have an extensive history.318 Yet as Gerald
Neuman has observed, "[ljocal anti-foreign movements may have dif-
ficulty enlisting the national government in their crusades, in part be-
cause emotions are not running so high in other states at the moment,
and in part because aliens have some virtual representation in Wash-
ington by means of the foreign affairs establishment." 319
In addition, there is something to be said for holding Congress to
the foreign affairs rationale that has come to insulate federal alienage
classifications from close judicial scrutiny. If foreign policy considera-
tions truly require deferential judicial treatment of immigration law-
making, then that lawmaking should be undertaken exclusively at the
national level, where foreign affairs are properly conducted. 320
The principal policy defense of devolution is the argument by
Peter Spiro that the PRA's authorization to the states "should be ap-
plauded as a lesser evil. '321 This view is directed at devolution of theimmigration power in the specific context of welfare restrictions.
Spiro posits that allowing states to deny benefits to immigrants will
reduce the likelihood that frustrated anti-immigrant states would
press Congress to mandate discriminatory classifications nationally.
318 See Neuman, supra note 79, at 1436 ("The geographical distribution of immigrants
from various countries has often led to localized anti-alien movements .... ") (citing histor-
ical examples from Thomas J. Curran, Xenophobia and Immigration, 1820-1930 (1975)).
See generally Higham, supra note 26, at 165-75; Nativism, Discrimination, and Images of
Immigrants (George E. Pozzetta ed., 1991); Joe R. Feagin, Old Poison in New Bottles: The
Deep Roots of Modem Nativism, in Immigrants Out! The New Nativism and the Anti-
Immigrant Impulse in the United States 13, 19-28 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997).
319 Neuman, supra note 79, at 1436-37. It bears noting as well that devolution of the
immigration power might lead to the undermining of state-level constitutional protections
even for citizens, in the name of a broader immigration policy. See supra note 177.
320 See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text; see also Neuman, supra note 79, at
1439 ("Congress's abdication of the eligibility issue to the states would demonstrate that
these considerations of foreign policy and national sovereignty do not require ineligibility
for state benefits.").
321 Spiro, supra note 81, at 1637. Of course, devolution of the immigration power also is
consistent with an undifferentiated preference for "states rights" and state exercise of gov-
ernmental power of all sorts. See Fix & Tumlin, supra note 7, at 3 ("The case for...
devolution of immigrant policy to the states mirrors arguments for... devolution gener-
ally. That is, proponents of devolution argue that lodging immigrant policy with state and
local governments allows them to target benefits and services more efficiently to the needs
of local populations."). The remainder of this Section will address Peter Spiro's argument
as a more refined version of the general policy preference for local control.
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This argument for "steam valve federalism '322 draws on public choice
analysis323 and history.
324
It is far from clear, however, that the episodic history of federal
anti-immigrant legislation fairly is described as resulting from the ef-
forts of states frustrated by the judicial invalidation of local discrimi-
natory measures. This historical claim probably holds up best for the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 32 5 whose passage was championed by
California legislators reacting in part to the Supreme Court's invalida-
tion of a restrictionist California state statute.326 But the claim does
not explain adequately passage of three anti-immigrant statutes in
1996,327 nor passage of other major restrictionist legislation in the last
322 Spiro, supra note 81, at 1630; see also id. at 1627 ("[Sjtate-level authority will allow
those states harboring intense anti-alien sentiment to act on those sentiments at the state
level... [thereby ensuring that] one state's preferences, frustrated at home, are not visited
on the rest of us by way of Washington.").
323 The public-choice analysis reasons that congressional representatives of a state with
an "intense preference" for anti-immigrant measures may overcome the "more or less neu-
tral posture" of representation from other states, "by virtue of political logrolling." Id. at
1634-35 & 1634 n.29.
324 In an essay that does not purport to undertake a major historical analysis of federal
anti-immigrant legislation, Spiro contends that two significant enactments of federal anti-
immigrant legislation, one in the late nineteenth century and the other in 1996, followed
judicial invalidation of local anti-immigrant measures. Id. at 1630-32.
325 Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (suspending immigration from China for ten
years).
326 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875) (striking down California law requiring
ships bringing "lewd and debauched women" to post bonds for them); Spiro, supra note 81,
at 1631-32 (summarizing historical materials). The notion of "steam valve federalism" also
may explain the enactment of a second restrictionist measure in 1882, the passage of which
was advocated by New York following invalidation of its immigration statute. Act of Aug.
3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (excluding paupers, convicts, and "lunatics"); Henderson v.
Wickham, 92 U.S. 259 (1875) (invalidating similar New York law requiring bonds for all
arriving immigrants); see also Salyer, supra note 48, at 5-6 (recounting that New York
advocates, "finally accepting the Supreme Court's rulings that only the federal government
could legislate in the area, began to lobby Congress to enact head taxes and to exclude
criminals and paupers .... New York succeeded in getting congressional action." (footnote
omitted)).
327 In addition to the PRA, Congress passed AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996), on the first anniversary of the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma
City, principally to enact revisions to the federal habeas corpus statute long sought by
conservative proponents of capital punishment. But AEDPA also made important changes
to the immigration laws regarding permanent residents with criminal convictions. Five
months later, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibil-
ity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.), which also focused primarily on legal immigrants with criminal convictions and
thereby implemented an important aspect of the House Republicans' 1994 "Contract with
America." See Contract with America: The Bold Plan by Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep, Dick
Armey, and the House Republicans to Change the Nation 38, 54-58 (Ed Gillespie & Bob
Schellhas eds., 1994) [hereinafter Contract with America] (stating that Republicans would
"address[ ] one of the most pressing problems in our country today" by "streamlin[ing] the
current [convicted] alien deportation system").
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century.328 Nor does the "steam valve" narrative of frustrated anti-
immigrant states resorting to national legislation correlate well with
the history of judicial invalidation of state alienage classifications, in-
cluding judicial invalidation of state or local anti-immigrant discrimi-
nation in welfare programs,3 29 education,330 and employment.331
As to the PRA, Spiro is undoubtedly correct that judicial injunctions of California's
Proposition 187, reprinted in League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 90S F. Supp.
755 app. A at 787-91 (C.D. Cal. 1995), which had attempted to deny most benefits to nonci-
tizens in the state, spurred some California legislators to press for federal welfare reform.
But the PRA was itself the product of multiple forces, including the House Republicans
Contract with America, see Contract with America, supra, at 73, 76 (calling for denial of
AFDC, SSI, Food Stamps, and other benefits to noncitizens, subject to narrow exceptions);
the intention of the Republican presidential nominee, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole,
to pass welfare legislation that President Bill Clinton would fear to veto, see Adam
Clymer, Republicans Shift Strategy in Bid to Avoid Welfare Bill Veto, N.Y. Times, July 12,
1996, at A18; and the desire of the President to remove an issue from the campaign while
making good on his own 1992 campaign commitment to "ending welfare as we know it,"
see Bill Clinton & Al Gore, Putting People F'rst How We Can All Change America 164
(1992). That the House, Senate, and President had compelling reasons to enact major
welfare cuts in the summer of 1996 had little to do with California's frustration at the
judicial determination that Proposition 187 was preempted by federal law, and indeed the
legislative decision to focus those cuts on immigrants hardly received unanimous support
from the California legislative delegation. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S8501 (daily ed. July
23, 1996) (showing that both senators from California opposed anti-immigrant provisions
of PRA); 142 Cong. Rec. H7796 (daily ed. July 18, 1996) (same, as to leading representa-
tives from California).
328 In addition to the two episodes considered by Spiro, Congress enacted significant
restrictionist legislation in 1891, 1917, 1921, 1924, 1952, and 1986. Immigration Reform
and Control Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359; Act of June 27, 1952,
ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163; Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190,43 Stat. 153; Quota Act of 1921, ch.
8,42 Stat. 5; Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29,39 Stat. 874; Act of March 3,1891, ch. 551, 26
Stat. 1084. Yet these enactments do not fit the model of "steam valve federalism." See
Salyer, supra note 48, at 23-32 (attributing 1891 Act to scandal involving mismanagement
of New York immigration station by state officials and to frustration at federal courts over-
whelmed with habeas corpus petitions in California); id. at 122-35 (attributing 1921 and
1924 Acts to rise of nativism, economic difficulties after end of World War I boom, growth
of eugenics movement, fear of war with Japan, lingering World War I nationalism, and Red
Scare of 1919-20); U.S. Select Comm'n on Immigration & Refugee Policy, Staff Report on
U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest 182-84 (1981) (linking passage of 1S91
Act to rise of nativism, itself grounded in closing of U.S. frontier, increasing urbanization
and industrialization, arrival of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, and Catho-
lic and Jewish religion of many new immigrants); id. at 189 (explaining 1917 Act as passed
"in large measure because World War I brought nervousness about the loyalty and assimi-
lability of the foreign born to a fever pitch"); id. at 203-04 (stating that 1952 Act resulted
from virulent anticommunism that "often took the form of opposition to anything
foreign").
329 For example, in the welfare context, it was in 1971 that Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971), struck down state anti-immigrant provisions (those in Pennsylvania and
Arizona), but it was not until 1996 and the PRA that federal legislation authorized or
mandated similar classifications.
330 In 1977, the Supreme Court invalidated New York's denial of student financial aid to
permanent residents, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977), and in 1982 it held further that
Texas public schools could not exclude undocumented children, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
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Finally, it bears repeating that the episodic history of restrictionist
legislation at the federal level sadly is matched by the extensive record
of state and local anti-immigrant discrimination.332 This history un-
dermines any claim that occasional national anti-immigrant legislation
is preferable to widespread local measures.
In short, judicial invalidation of state alienage classifications
rarely has provoked frustrated states to seek to impose their anti-im-
migrant preferences at the national level. Rather, invalidation gener-
ally has led to local accommodation. Moreover, historical accounts of
most restrictionist federal legislation do not reveal frustrated states
seeking an outlet for their anti-immigrant bias. History simply does
not support reliance on "steam valve federalism" as a reason to cele-
brate the claimed new state freedom to discriminate against immi-
grants. Instead, to preserve the vitality of antidiscrimination
principles that should continue to protect permanent resident aliens
from oppressive state and local measures, and to cabin the corrosive
effects of judicial deference to immigration lawmaking, we should em-
brace nondevolvability on principle.
IV
OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
TO A NoNDEVOLVABILITY PRINCIPLE
A critic might identify several defects in the proposition that the
federal immigration power is exclusively federal and not subject to
devolution by statute. A historical objection derives from recent
scholarship demonstrating that in the nation's first century, states
heavily regulated immigration. 333 A second objection arises from Na-
tive American law, the only other area of equal protection jurispru-
dence in which the standard of constitutional scrutiny varies
(1982), but neither state rushed to Congress for a fix. It was not until 1996 that Congress
seriously debated a federal provision to deny public education to undocumented children.
See Spiro, supra note 81, at 1633 n.27.
331 The Supreme Court began invalidating state restrictions on the commercial or em-
ployment activities of permanent residents as early as 1886, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating state alienage-based restrictions on license to operate laun-
dry); see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (invalidating state
law preventing noncitizens of Japanese descent from holding commercial fishing licenses);
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (invalidating state law placing cap on employment of
noncitizens), and then again in a wave of modem cases, see cases cited supra note 12.
None of these decisions appears to have prompted a state effort to obtain national legisla-
tion mandating or authorizing the failed state licensing and employment rules,
332 See Higham, supra note 26, at 46, 72-73, 161-62, 260, 268 (mentioning states' anti-
immigrant legislation); Neuman, supra note 79, at 1436 (noting states' history of xenopho-
bia-inspired legislation).
333 See infra notes 337-43 and accompanying text.
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depending on whether a classification is state or federal. 33 It appears
that in Native American law the federal government can authorize an
otherwise impermissible state classification. Third, William Cohen has
argued that adoption of a "consent principle" would bring greater the-
oretical coherence to several doctrines of congressional authorization
of state activity3 3 5 In one specific application of his proposed princi-
ple, Cohen contends that Congress should be able to authorize states
to deny benefits to legal immigrants336
A. An Objection from History
For many years, it was generally believed that our borders were
unregulated before the 1880s. 337 A landmark study by Gerald
Neuman dispelled that myth, however, and demonstrated not only
that the borders were regulated, but that to a large extent it was the
states that enacted and enforced controls over immigration.3m Histor-
ical evidence that the states once engaged in substantial immigration
lawmaking could challenge any theory that the power to regulate im-
migration is an exclusively federal, nondevolvable power.
One response could be that these state laws were widespread but
unconstitutional.339 A second possibility is that the Reconstruction
Amendments, which broadly confirmed the supremacy of federal
power over states' rights, also extinguished state authority to regulateimmigration-sort of an implicit "constitutional moment" for immi-
gration law. This interpretation would build on Neuman's hypothesis
that it was the dispute over slavery which made federal immigration
regulation impossible before the Civil War.34° On this view, one
might posit that with the abolition of slavery, the federal immigration
power was unleashed and all state power destroyed irrevocably.
A better interpretation is that the pre-Civil War characterization
of constitutionally acceptable state border regulation was correct: It
was an exercise of the state police power.341 And while the exercises
334 See infra notes 344-51 and accompanying text.
335 William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws. A
Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 387 (1983).
336 Id. at 419-22.
337 See Neuman, supra note 46, at 1833-34.
338 Neuman's research reveals that state legislation long restricted the movement across
state boundaries of slaves, free blacks, and black seamen; indigent and disabled persons;
persons with criminal convictions; and persons with contagious diseases. Id. at 1841-80.
339 But see id. at 1885-96 (suggesting that early state laws regulating immigration may
have been constitutional).
340 See id. at 1897 ("When slavery ceased to divide the nation, national immigration
regulation became possible.").
341 Compare The Passenger Cases (Smith v. Turner), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (inval-
idating state head taxes on passengers as beyond police power and infringing on federal
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of state police power detailed by Neuman undeniably operated as reg-
ulation of immigration, there is no evidence that they were entitled to
any sort of special judicial deference. 342 That is, the state rules were
not an exercise of an immigration power, and they were therefore not
insulated from judicial review by the "plenary power doctrine" or any
other theory that connects immigration with foreign affairs or national
sovereignty. Under this view, there is no inconsistency between
Neuman's history and a nondevolvability theory.343
Thus, although the early history of state border regulation might
suggest that the constitutional immigration power is not necessarily an
exclusively federal power, in fact these early state regulations were
nothing more than an exercise of traditional state police powers. It is
unlikely that these state laws were understood by the courts or others
as in any way a local exercise of foreign affairs or national security
powers, and even more unlikely that these laws received special judi-
cial deference because they touched on international relations or ema-
nated from national sovereignty. In this sense, then, early state
immigration regulation is no different from modern state laws affect-
ing immigrants: These rules, including state welfare rules, are enacted
pursuant to traditional spending and police powers, and they are enti-
tled to no special judicial deference. The history of early state regula-
tions affecting immigrants is not at all inconsistent with the theory that
the federal immigration power is nondevolvable.
B. An Objection from Native American Jurisprudence
Native American law appears to be the only other area of equal
protection jurisprudence in which the degree of constitutional scrutiny
depends on whether a measure is undertaken by the federal govern-
commerce authority), with Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) (up-
holding state rule requiring provision of ship manifests as valid exercise of police power).
342 See, e.g., Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 142-43 (upholding ship manifest rule as valid
exercise of state police power without granting special deference to rule as immigration
regulation); id. at 148 (opinion of Thompson, J.) (stating:
Can anything fall more directly within the police power and internal regulation
of a state, than that which concerns the care and management of paupers or
convicts, or any other class or description of persons that may be thrown into
the country, and likely to endanger its safety, or become chargeable for their
maintenance?).
343 Moreover, it is not surprising that to the extent that exercises of state police power
discriminated between citizens and immigrants, that discrimination was not challenged in
the courts. For one thing, until ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, federal
due process norms did not apply to the states, let alone did any embedded equal protection
norms. And even as to equal protection clauses in state constitutions, which might have
provided the basis to challenge state anti-immigrant measures, perhaps all that can be said
is that contemporary understandings of those clauses were unknown in the first part of the
nineteenth century.
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ment or a state, 44 and it is from this jurisprudence that a second po-
tential criticism might arise. Federal laws that single out Native
Americans are subject to rational basis review, provided the law is
related to federal trust and treaty responsibilities,345 while state laws
that single out Native Americans are subject to strict scrutiny.-
6
Importantly for the post-1996 alienage cases, however, the Su-
preme Court has indicated in a brief passage that federally authorized
state legislation regarding Native Americans is subject only to ration-
ality review. In Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 47 the Supreme
Court upheld a state's assertion of partial jurisdiction over "Indian
country." The Court concluded that the state legislation was enacted
"under explicit authority granted by Congress," 48 and therefore the
state statute was subject only to rationality review when challenged on
equal protection grounds 3 49 Since 1979, several courts have inter-
preted Yakima Indian Nation as holding that federally authorized
state legislation singling out Native Americans is subject only to ra-
tionality review35 0-at least where states have legislated for the bene-
344 Actually, one other example of disparate standards of equal protection review exists,
although it seems to be little more than an historical anomaly. For six years between the
Supreme Court's decisions in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(stating that state and local affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny), and
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (same, as to federal affirmative
action programs), there technically existed different standards of review for state and fed-
eral affirmative action programs. See Neuman, supra note 79, at 1432-34; see also
Carrasco, supra note 146, at 604-05 (noting, in article written between Croson and
Adarand, different standards of review for state and federal affirmative action programs).
345 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (upholding employment preference for
Native Americans at Bureau of Indian Affairs as rationally related to federal trust and
treaty responsibilities); Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 654-58 (1982)
[hereinafter Cohen's Handbook].
346 Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979) ("[Tlhe unique
legal status of Indian tribes under federal law' permits the Federal Government to enact
legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally
offensive. States do not enjoy this same unique relationship with Indians." (quoting
Morton, 417 U.S. at 551-52)); Cohen, supra note 335, at 658-59. But see Cohen, supra note
335, at 659 (stating:.
[S]ome of the Supreme Court equal protection decisions seem to be based
more on the unique status of the tribes themselves .... If Indians are a legiti-
mate classification for protective federal laws, their status is arguably the same
for state laws of that character. Such state laws have long been assumed valid.
(footnotes omitted)).
347 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
348 Id. at 501.
349 Id. at 500-01. The two intermediate state court decisions upholding post-PRA alien-
age classifications have relied, erroneously, see infra notes 352-70 and accompanying text,
on this very passage from Yakima Indian Nation, see Aliessa v. Novello, 712 N.Y.S.2d 96,
98-99 (App. Div. 2000); Alvarino v. Wing, 690 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (App. Div. 1999).
350 E.g., Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thomburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1218 (5th Cir.
1991) (subjecting exemption for Native American Church from state prohibition on peyote
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fit of Native Americans.351 By analogy, one might suggest that
Congress's effort to authorize state welfare discrimination against per-
manent residents should operate similarly to ratchet down the consti-
tutional scrutiny to mere rationality review.
Such an analogy would be inapt, however. First, the Supreme
Court has held that federal legislation singling out Native Americans
is subject to rationality review in the context of laws that benefit Na-
tive Americans. 352 Similarly, those few courts to apply rationality re-
view to state laws singling out Native Americans did so in the context
of reviewing benign state laws.3 53 Nothing in the Native American
cases suggests that rationality review is appropriate for federally au-
thorized state welfare laws that discriminate against immigrants.3 54
possession to rationality review on grounds that "Yakima teaches that states may exercise
the federal trust power pursuant to express Congressional authorization"); see also Living-
ston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110, 1115-16 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding that state's compelling "edu-
cational, cultural and artistic interests" justify ordinance allowing only Native American
vendors on museum grounds); St. Paul Intertribal Hous. Bd. v. Reynolds, 564 F. Supp.
1408, 1412 (D. Minn. 1983) (upholding state Native American housing program and noting
that "state action for the benefit of Indians can also fall under the trust doctrine and there-
fore be protected from challenge under the equal protection clause or civil rights statutes"
(citations omitted)); Krueth v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 496 N.W.2d 829, 836 (Minn. Ct. App,
1993) (upholding state layoff protection for Native American teachers because "[t]he trust
doctrine also applies to state action" (citing St. Paul Intertribal Hous. Bd., 564 F. Supp. at
1412)).
351 See Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1218 (upholding exemption for Native American
Church for state prohibition on peyote possession); Livingston, 601 F.2d at 1116 (uphold-
ing exemption for Native Americans from ordinance barring sale of goods in town plaza);
St. Paul Intertribal Hous. Bd., 564 F. Supp. at 1412 (upholding state program for Native
American housing); Krueth, 496 N.W.2d at 836 (upholding state layoff protection for Na-
tive American teachers).
352 E.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (upholding employment preference for
Native Americans in federal Bureau of Indian Affairs). Although the Court declared the
principle of rationality review upon consideration of a remedial classification, it also has
applied the standard to uphold jurisdictional statutes over the objection of Native Ameri-
cans who resisted them. See Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979) (upholding state's
assertion of partial jurisdiction over reservation); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641
(1977) (upholding federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians); see also Duro v. Reina, 495
U.S. 676, 692 (1990) (remarking upon "the Federal Government's broad authority to legis-
late with respect to enrolled Indians as a class, whether to impose burdens or benefits").
353 See cases cited supra note 351.
354 The constitutional distinction between benign and invidious race classifications has
been rejected by the Supreme Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995) (stating that federal affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (same, as to state and local affirma-
tive action programs). Neither of those cases should call into question the continuing va-
lidity of Morton v. Mancari. This is because Mancari phrased the constitutional standard
for review of tribal classifications as rationally related to the special trust relationship. It is
hard to understand how singling out Native Americans for disfavored treatment would be
in furtherance of the trust relationship. Cf. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 244-45 & 244 n.3
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("We should reject a concept of 'consistency' that would view the
special preferences that the National Government has provided to Native Americans since
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Second, the constituent elements of the federal power to regulate
Native American affairs differ in important ways from those of the
federal immigration power, and the former well may be devolvable.
A comprehensive analysis of the plenary power to regulate Native
American affairs is beyond the scope of this Article, but a few points
bear noting. The Supreme Court has described the sources of the ple-
nary power over Native Americans as arising from the Indian Com-
merce Clause,3 55 the Treaty Clause,3 56 and the unique "guardian-
ward" relationship which arose from the history of United States con-
quest and oppression of Native Americans. 3 7 Of the textual sources
of the plenary power over Native American affairs, the treaty power is
exclusively federal? 58 The Supreme Court has not treated the Indian
1834 as comparable to the official discrimination against African-Americans that was prev-
alent for much of our history." (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 541)). Nor are the Supreme
Court cases upholding assertion of general civil or criminal jurisdiction over "Indian coun-
try" to the contrary, see Yakina Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 463; Antelope, 430 U.S. at 641,
as those decisions involved the extension of rules of general applicability (albeit over Indi-
ans' objections), rather than the enactment of laws that singled out Native Americans for
disfavored treatment. But cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special
Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 Yale LJ. 537, 597 n246 (1996) (noting
that trust relationship may allow legislation that actually does not benefit Indians).
355 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power to "regulate Commerce... with
the Indian Tribes").
356 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (authorizing President to make treaties, by and with advice and
consent of Senate).
357 See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645 & n.6 (justifying preferential treatment of Native
Americans on basis of "a history of treaties and the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' sta-
tus"); Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551-53 (discussing unique status of Native American tribes
under federal law); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973)
("The source of federal authority over Indian matters has been the subject of some confu-
sion, but it is now generally recognized that the power derives from federal responsibility
for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making."); Cohen's Handbook,
supra note 345, at 211 ("Court opinions most often refer to the Indian Commerce Clause,
the Treaty Clause, and the Supremacy Clause in discussing the source of federal power
over Indian affairs."); see also id. at 209 (noting that Property Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV,
§ 3, c. 2, granting Congress power to dispose of and regulate "the Territory or other Prop-
erty belonging to the United States," also has been identified as source of federal power to
regulate Indian affairs). In addition, in the nineteenth century, the Court occasionally de-
scribed the power to regulate Native American affairs as inherent or extraconstitutional, in
a manner not unlike some explanations for the source of the federal immigration and for-
eign affairs powers. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886); see
also Cleveland, supra note 288, at 1137-42; Philip Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian
Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 31, 60-66 (1996). As one commentator has observed, however:
More recently, the Court has moved away from Kaganma's suggestion of ex-
traconstitutional powers and has instead grounded Congress's power over In-
dians-and the concomitant special relationship between the federal
government and Indian tribes-in the Indian Commerce Clause and, at least to
some extent, the Treaty Clause of Article II.
Benjamin, supra note 354, at 543.
358 See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
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commerce power as analogous to the foreign commerce power, how-
ever, with the latter's attendant requirement that the nation "speak
with one voice; '359 rather, the Court has analogized the Indian com-
merce power to the interstate commerce power,360 the latter a power
plainly shared by the states. Likewise, in light of the history of state
participation in the conquest and oppression of Native Americans, it is
not far-fetched to suggest that the states too bear a special responsibil-
ity towards Native Americans. 361 Certainly, there are not textual or
precedential limitations on the devolvability of the elements of the
plenary federal power over Native American affairs comparable to
those restricting the devolvability of the elements of the immigration
power, namely the naturalization,362 foreign affairs,363 and foreign
commerce powers.364
Finally, the Supreme Court's basis for applying rationality review
to federal tribal classifications differs significantly from the rationale
underlying the Court's rulings on federal alienage classifications. In
Morton v. Mancari,65 a unanimous Court held that tribal classifica-
tions were "political rather than racial in nature,"366 based on mem-
bership in "quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities
are governed by the [U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs] in a unique fash-
ion.' '367 These political classifications derived from the political his-
tory of Native Americans, and thus "[a]s long as the special treatment
can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress's unique obliga-
tion toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be dis-
turbed. '368 The rationale underlying alienage classifications, of
course, is quite different. Only three years before Morton, its author,
Justice Blackmun, had likened discrimination against immigrants to
359 See supra notes 267-80 and accompanying text.
360 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996).
361 In a brief passage, the Supreme Court would appear to have rejected this proposi-
tion. See Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979) ("[T]he unique
legal status of Indian tribes under federal law permits the Federal Government to enact
legislation singling out tribal Indians .... States do not enjoy this same unique relation-
ship with Indians . .." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
362 See supra notes 210-35 and accompanying text.
363 See supra notes 236-66 and accompanying text.
364 See supra notes 267-86 and accompanying text.
365 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
366 Id. at 553 n.24; see also id. at 553 ("[T]his preference does not constitute 'racial
discrimination.' Indeed, it is not even a 'racial' preference."); id. at 553 n.24 ("The prefer-
ence is not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only
to members of 'federally recognized' tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals
who are racially to be classified as 'Indians."').
367 Id. at 554.
368 Id. at 555; see also Benjamin, supra note 354, at 545-48 (reviewing rationale for treat-
ing tribal classifications as political, not racial).
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discrimination "based on nationality or race,"3 69 and concluded for
another unanimous Court that "classifications based on alienage...
are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." 370
Therefore, the different rationales underlying the Supreme Court's
analysis of tribal and alienage classifications further undermine any
suggestion that judicial treatment of federally authorized state tribal
classifications supplies a helpful analogy for understanding federally
authorized state alienage classifications.
C. An Objection from Theory
A final objection arises from the scholarship of William Cohen,
who in considering legislative authorization of otherwise impermissi-
ble state conduct has proposed a "consent principle," pursuant to
which "Congress can consent to state laws where constitutional re-
strictions bind the states but not Congress."'371 As an example, Cohen
specifically contends that Congress conceivably could authorize the
states to deny welfare benefits to permanent resident aliens.
3 72
In the context of federally authorized state alienage classifica-
tions, Cohen's proposal should be rejected. Most importantly, it over-
looks the core anticaste principles at issue in all alienage
classifications, state or federal. The "consent principle" account of
federally authorized state discrimination against immigrants treats
Graham and its progeny in effect as preemption cases,13s ignoring the
equal protection holdings that, as applied to noncitizens, trace an arc
from Yick Wo through Takahashi and Graham. Yet in the Supreme
Court's reasoning, only when these antidiscrimination principles must
be balanced with concerns of foreign affairs, as in Mathews, or impli-
cate core political functions of state government, as in Ambach, do
alienage classifications survive. In its most recent application of
Graham, the Court declined to ignore the equality principles at the
core of the jurisprudence,374 however, and wisely so.3 75 In addition,
369 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
370 Id.; see also Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
("[D]isparate treatment accorded a class of similarly circumstanced persons who histori-
cally have been disabled by the prejudice of the majority ... led the Court to conclude [in
Graham] that alienage classifications in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy...
and therefore demand close judicial scrutiny." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
371 Cohen, supra note 335, at 406.
372 Id. at 419-22.
373 See id. at 420.
374 See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219-20 (1984) (invalidating state law barring
permanent residents from serving as notaries public, as failing strict scrutiny).
375 See Koh, supra note 44, at 103 (criticizing argument that preemption analysis of state
alienage classifications is superior to equal protection assessment).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2001]
HeinOnline -- 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 565 2001
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the consent principle should be rejected as to state alienage classifica-
tions in light of the history of local anti-immigrant measures, and the
fallacy of any notion of "steam valve federalism. '376
Moreover, contrary to Cohen's conclusion, the PRA would not
even survive application of the proposed consent principle. This is so
because Congress itself may not be empowered directly to legislate
the post-PRA patchwork of divergent state welfare laws, in light of
the requirement of national uniformity found in at least one source of
the federal immigration power, the Naturalization Clause. 377 Cohen
recognizes that application of his consent principle may be compli-
cated when "there is an express constitutional requirement that na-
tional laws be geographically uniforr. '' 378 He does not address the
uniformity issue in his discussion of state alienage classifications, 379
however, and elsewhere he acknowledges "not having done any
homework" on the uniformity requirement of the "Rules [sic] of
Naturalization. 380
CONCLUSION
Common sense instructs that a world in which states issue visas
and operate border crossings would be absurd. But upon reflection,
answering the questions raised by the 1996 Welfare Act's attempted
devolution of the federal immigration power becomes less straightfor-
ward. In the nation's first century, the states did enact numerous reg-
ulations that look to the modem eye like immigration rules.
Moreover, while the Supreme Court has identified several sources for
the federal immigration power, the power is itself unenumerated. As
376 See supra notes 325-32 and accompanying text.
377 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Under Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), a federal
alienage classification survives equal protection scrutiny only because it was enacted as a
permissible exercise of the federal immigration power. See id. at 79-80.
378 Cohen, supra note 335, at 404. Cohen suggests that when a uniformity requirement
limits only the federal government and not the states, the requirement should not prevent
federal authorization of disuniform state measures. Id. at 405-06. But if the state measures
are impermissible in their own right, regardless of their uniformity (as with state alienage
classifications under Graham), and the federal government must act uniformly or not at all,
then Cohen's resolution yields bizarre results: In effect, he is arguing that states should be
able to engage in disuniform practices that would be impermissible if done directly by
Congress.
379 See id. at 419-22.
380 Id. at 409 n.102. In Cohen's defense and as discussed supra Part III.B.1, the Natural-
ization Clause is but one source of the federal immigration power, and the other sources
are not necessarily limited by uniformity requirements. Moreover, as the Court explained
in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900), geographic uniformity may well differ from
"intrinsic" uniformity, id. at 89, and it is uncertain that only the former would be impli-
cated by divergent state welfare rules.
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such, it is impossible to point to an express textual bar to devolution
of immigration lawmaking.
But consideration of the past century of precedent on state regu-
lation of immigration, the textual, historical, and jurisprudential limits
on devolution of the identified sources of the immigration power, and
the desirability of preserving the vitality of the equality norms that
have for over a century shielded noncitizens from state and local big-
otry, together confirm that first impression: States possess no power
to regulate immigration, and the federal government may not devolve
by statute its own immigration power. Accordingly, although states
are plainly empowered to enact welfare rules pursuant to their tradi-
tional spending and police powers, those rules are entitled to none of
the judicial deference reserved for exercises of the federal immigra-
tion power. State anti-immigrant rules should be subject to height-
ened equal protection scrutiny, as they were before the PRA. Only
the secondary objection to discriminatory local rules-that they are
preempted by federal permission for legal immigrants to reside here-
has been eliminated.
Application of a nondevolvability principle and the existing juris-
prudence of alienage classifications to the range of post-PRA state
measures yields several conclusions. Most obviously, the several
states that have outright denied Medicaid, TANF, or GA benefits to
permanent residents are presumptively in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment38 1 Nearly as obvious, those states that have conditioned
receipt of Medicaid, TANF, or GA on satisfaction by permanent re-
sidents of immigrant-only eligibility criteria, including special resi-
dency requirements, naturalization rules, or other provisions, similarly
have engaged in discrimination that is presumptively invalid.3s -
More complicated to assess are those state-substitute programs,
created for some immigrants, in which a state has used 100% state
funds to replace either purely federal benefits now denied permanent
residents (such as SSI and Food Stamps) or joint federal-state benefits
now denied permanent residents (such as TANF benefits for perma-
nent residents arriving after August 22, 1996 and subject to a five-year
381 These include Alabama, which has denied TANF benefits to permanent residents,
see supra note 9; Wyoming, which has denied Medicaid benefits, see id.; Pennsylvania,
which enacted a bar on cash and medical benefits for permanent residents but has not
enforced its bar because of an Opinion Letter issued by its Attorney General, Official
Opinion No. 96-1, Op. Att'y Gen. of Pa. (Dec. 9, 1996), 1996 Pa. AG LEXIS 2; Louisiana,
which promulgated but then rescinded an emergency rule denying Medicaid to permanent
residents, see supra note 9; and states such as New York, which have denied to permanent
residents state medical or cash assistance provided to citizens, see supra note 122.
382 See supra notes 9, 119-24.
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bar).383 As to the joint federal-state programs, at a minimum, a state
may not permissibly deny to permanent residents those state funds
previously spent as the state share of the joint federal program-that
is, for every dollar the state spends on a resident citizen, it must spend
an equal amount on a resident alien. It may be as well that because
the state's expenditures for citizens reap a federal match, thereby en-
suring full benefits to the resident citizen, a state is obligated constitu-
tionally to replace the federal portion now denied resident aliens with
a like amount. States, however, may not be constitutionally obligated
to replace purely federal programs with state-funded programs, where
the state is not already spending any of its own funds for resident
citizens. 384
The proposition that Congress may not devolve by statute its im-
migration power to the States may be faulted for exalting a structural
argument over the more compelling moral claim that legal immigrants
are entitled to equality of treatment by all government entities, state
or federal.385 But a nondevolvability approach fits well within the set-
tled jurisprudence of alienage classifications, accommodating both
Graham and Mathews. It also avoids the shortcomings of previous
analyses of federally authorized, state-imposed alienage classifica-
tions, and it is responsive to the Court's attention to constitutional
structure and design, even in cases pressing a claim for individual
rights.386
In the end, Congress's attempt to devolve its exclusive immigra-
tion power to the states must fail. Evaluation of anti-immigrant state
welfare rules is not about the "plenary power doctrine" of immigra-
tion law, or deference to foreign affairs and national security interests,
because states do not and cannot exercise any immigration power.
383 See supra note 9.
384 Similarly, while the current alienage jurisprudence does not extend clearly to legal
immigrants other than permanent residents, the rationale of Graham and its progeny
would seem to apply with equal force to other legally present noncitizens, who also work,
pay taxes, and often form extensive and long-term ties to their communities in the United
States.
385 Cf. Koh, supra note 44, at 103 (urging rejection of "cold, impersonal, and incom-
plete" preemption approach to state alienage classifications in favor of equal protection
approach that can address "moral and personal concerns" of noncitizens); Neuman, supra
note 79, at 1439 ("[P]reemption doctrine is not directly responsive to the problem. ... ").
386 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498-505 (1999) (holding that California statute limit-
ing benefits for new residents violated Privileges and Immunities Clause by deterring intra-
state "migration" despite contrary argument that such deterrence merely was "incidental"
and bore rational relation to state interest); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626-36 (1996)
(finding clear violation of Equal Protection Clause despite contrary argument that Colo-
rado constitutional amendment merely "den[ied] homosexuals special rights"); Tribe,
supra note 4, at 110 & n.3 (arguing that current Court repeatedly has protected individual
rights by reasoning from "structural inference").
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Rather, to determine the constitutionality of these rules under the
Equal Protection Clause, courts should heed the four words with
which Justice Blackmun opened the Court's modem alienage jurispru-
dence: "These are welfare cases. '38 7
387 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 366 (1971).
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